Ethics of Computer Games

关于电脑游戏的一个主要的伦理问题，正在讨论的学术哲学是：什么-如果有的话-是道德上错误的玩暴力电脑游戏？通常的方法试图通过应用规范伦理学的三个经典理论之一来回答这个问题。在这一过程中，他们都面临着一个基本的问题，即荒唐的道德主义。根据游戏道德主义的观点，电脑游戏不能接受道德评价，因为它们仅仅是通过超越道德评价现实的界限来定义的游戏。通常的方法受到批评，因为它们不能识别电脑游戏内在的道德问题。相反，这些方法是基于这样的假设：接触电脑游戏具有严重的负面因果影响。然而，这种影响是否真的存在是值得怀疑的;更一般地说，确定这种影响是否存在不是一项哲学任务，而是一项经验任务。从哲学的角度来看，电脑游戏的道德可接受性问题之所以如此引人注目，是因为人们普遍认为，玩某些暴力电脑游戏本质上是错误的，也就是说，不管任何假定的负面影响如何，这种活动都是错误的。本项目的目标是介绍和捍卫一个新的答案，以应对可笑的道德主义的挑战。在这个过程中，我将主张对目前的辩论进行两个主要的改变：1。对“伦理学”和“电脑游戏”的意义进行基本的哲学反思，将表明需要在多个伦理维度和多个游戏维度之间进行一些基本的概念区分。只有通过这种概念上的区别，我们才能准确地理解玩某些暴力电脑游戏有什么错（如果有的话）。这些概念上的区别使得辩论从玩电脑游戏的活动转向电脑游戏本身，即游戏作为交互符号系统成为可能。这种观点的变化允许打击可笑的道德与“赞同的看法”。根据它，计算机游戏（作为复杂的符号系统）可以正确地受到道德评价，因为它们不仅包含不道德的表现，而且还支持不道德的世界观。

One of the main ethical questions about computer games that is being discussed within academic philosophy is the following: What – if anything – is ethically wrong about playing violent computer games? The usual approaches try to answer this question by applying one of the three classical theories of normative ethics. In the process, they are all faced with the basic problem of ludic amoralism. According to ludic amoralism, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation insofar as they are merely games that are defined by the act of stepping outside the boundaries of morally assessable reality.The usual approaches have been criticized because they have not been able to identify intrinsic moral problems with regard to computer games. Instead, these approaches are based on the assumption that the exposure to computer games has severe negative causal effects. However, it is questionable whether such effects really exist; and more generally, it is not a philosophical but an empirical task to establish whether such effects exist. What makes the question about the moral acceptability of computer games so compelling from a philosophical perspective is the widespread intuition that there is something intrinsically wrong about playing certain violent computer games, i.e. that there is something wrong about such an activity regardless of any putative negative effects.The goal of this project is to introduce and defend a new answer to the challenge of ludic amoralism. In the process, I will argue for two main changes to the current debate:1. A fundamental philosophical reflection on the meaning of "ethics" and "computer game(ing)" will show the need for some basic conceptual distinctions between multiple ethical as well as multiple ludic dimensions. Only with such conceptual distinctions can we have a precise understanding of the question what (if anything) is wrong about playing certain violent computer games.2. These conceptual distinctions make it possible to change the debate from the activity of playing computer games to computer games themselves, i.e. games as interactive symbol systems. This change of perspective allows to combat ludic amoralism with the “endorsement-view”. According to it, computer games (as complex symbol systems) can be rightly subject to moral evaluation insofar as they do not only contain representations of immorality but also endorse an immoral worldview.