Ethics of Computer Games

学术哲学中正在讨论的关于电脑游戏的主要伦理问题之一是：玩暴力电脑游戏在伦理上是错误的--如果有什么错误的话？通常的方法是运用规范伦理学的三大经典理论之一来回答这个问题。在这个过程中，他们都面临着鲁迪亚非道德主义的基本问题。根据路德非道德主义，电脑游戏不能接受道德评估，因为它们只是一种被定义为超越道德评估现实界限的游戏。通常的方法受到批评，因为它们无法识别与电脑游戏有关的内在道德问题。相反，这些方法是基于这样的假设，即接触电脑游戏会产生严重的负面因果影响。然而，这种影响是否真的存在是值得怀疑的；更广泛地说，确定这种影响是否存在并不是一项哲学上的任务，而是一项经验任务。从哲学的角度来看，电脑游戏的道德可接受性问题之所以如此引人注目，是因为人们普遍直觉认为，玩某些暴力电脑游戏本质上是错误的，即无论任何假定的负面影响，这样的活动都存在错误。该项目的目标是引入并捍卫一种新的答案，以应对路德非道德主义的挑战。在这个过程中，我将主张对当前的辩论进行两个主要的改变：1.对“伦理”和“电脑游戏”的含义进行根本的哲学反思，将表明需要在多个伦理维度和多个音乐维度之间进行一些基本的概念区分。只有在概念上有了这样的区别，我们才能对玩某些暴力电脑游戏有什么(如果有的话)错误的问题有一个准确的理解。这些概念上的区别使得辩论从玩电脑游戏的活动转变为电脑游戏本身，即游戏作为互动的符号系统。这种视角的改变允许用“背书观点”来对抗鲁迪式的非道德主义。根据它的说法，电脑游戏(作为复杂的符号系统)可以理所当然地受到道德评估，因为它们不仅包含不道德的表现，而且支持不道德的世界观。

One of the main ethical questions about computer games that is being discussed within academic philosophy is the following: What – if anything – is ethically wrong about playing violent computer games? The usual approaches try to answer this question by applying one of the three classical theories of normative ethics. In the process, they are all faced with the basic problem of ludic amoralism. According to ludic amoralism, computer games cannot be subject to moral evaluation insofar as they are merely games that are defined by the act of stepping outside the boundaries of morally assessable reality.The usual approaches have been criticized because they have not been able to identify intrinsic moral problems with regard to computer games. Instead, these approaches are based on the assumption that the exposure to computer games has severe negative causal effects. However, it is questionable whether such effects really exist; and more generally, it is not a philosophical but an empirical task to establish whether such effects exist. What makes the question about the moral acceptability of computer games so compelling from a philosophical perspective is the widespread intuition that there is something intrinsically wrong about playing certain violent computer games, i.e. that there is something wrong about such an activity regardless of any putative negative effects.The goal of this project is to introduce and defend a new answer to the challenge of ludic amoralism. In the process, I will argue for two main changes to the current debate:1. A fundamental philosophical reflection on the meaning of "ethics" and "computer game(ing)" will show the need for some basic conceptual distinctions between multiple ethical as well as multiple ludic dimensions. Only with such conceptual distinctions can we have a precise understanding of the question what (if anything) is wrong about playing certain violent computer games.2. These conceptual distinctions make it possible to change the debate from the activity of playing computer games to computer games themselves, i.e. games as interactive symbol systems. This change of perspective allows to combat ludic amoralism with the “endorsement-view”. According to it, computer games (as complex symbol systems) can be rightly subject to moral evaluation insofar as they do not only contain representations of immorality but also endorse an immoral worldview.