Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Dynamics

该项目旨在设计最佳的销售政策，考虑到售后市场的动态，如转售和买家之间的竞争。售后市场的存在极大地影响了许可证拍卖、采购、特许经营等的最佳设计。例如，当市场许可证被拍卖时，现有公司可能会激烈竞争他们不需要的许可证，只是为了将进入者拒之门外。忽视这种投标激励的现有销售设计在实践中往往表现不佳。该项目旨在审查影响买方活动的信息政策，以最好地满足卖方的目标。它期望帮助监管机构设计更有效的许可证拍卖，为特许经营者提供更有利可图的策略，并在采购服务时节省纳税人的钱。

This project aims to design optimal selling policies, allowing for aftermarket dynamics such as resale and inter-buyer competitions. The existence of an aftermarket greatly affects the optimal design of license auctions, procurement, franchising and the like. For instance, when market licenses are auctioned off, incumbent firms may compete fiercely for licenses they do not need simply to keep entrants out. Existing sales designs that overlook such bidding incentives often underperform in practice. The project aims to examine informational policies that influence buyers’ activities to best suit the seller's objectives. It expects to help regulatory bodies to design more efficient license auctions, provide franchisors with more profitable strategies, and save taxpayers' money when procuring services.