First-party complements in platform markets: a dynamic perspective
First-party complements in platform markets: a dynamic perspective
批准号:
430677626
负责人:
Professor Dr. Tobias Kretschmer, Ph.D.
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
德国
项目类别:
Research Grants
财政年份:
2020
资助国家:
德国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2019-12-31 至 2022-12-31
中文摘要
平台市场中的互补产品要么由第三方供应商生产,要么由平台所有者自己生产。第一方互补语(FPC)的作用和动态是一个未被充分研究的现象。虽然它们在真实的平台市场中无处不在,但关于这一主题的学术文献却寥寥无几。此外,现有文献倾向于关注引入第一方补品对第三方生产者的影响,目前的研究结果并不明确。关于第一方互补是否有利于或阻碍第三方互补,文献没有达成共识的部分原因是平台所有者的战略考虑可能很复杂,并且可能随着时间的推移而改变。平台所有者何时以及为何引入第一方补充?他们将它们定位在哪里,这些定位如何取决于平台生命周期的阶段?使用电子游戏行业的丰富数据集,我们将测试平台所有者何时何地引入第一方补充内容,以及他们的策略如何取决于焦点平台(以及竞争平台)生命周期的阶段。在实证结果的基础上,我们建立了平台所有者可以引入第一方互补的差异化互补平台市场的正式模型。最后,我们扩展了我们的模型和实证分析,允许平台所有者将平台与其互补产品捆绑在一起,以研究平台所有者是否可以通过捆绑来确保其平台在其生命周期的不同阶段取得成功。我们的项目将为平台市场战略管理的新兴文献做出理论和实证贡献。
英文摘要
Complements in platform markets are either produced by third-party suppliers or the platform owner itself. The role and dynamics of first-party complements (FPC) are an understudied phenomenon. While they are ubiquitous in real platform markets, academic literature on the topic is sparse. Moreover, the existing literature tends to focus on the effect of the introduction of first-party complements on third-party producers, with ambiguous results so far. Part of the reason the literature has not come to a consensus on whether first-party complements benefit or hinder third-party complements is that the strategic considerations by platform owners can be complex and may change over time. When and why do platform owners introduce first-party complements? Where do they position them, and how does the positioning depend on the stage of the platform’s lifeycle? Using a rich dataset on the video game industry we will test empirically where and when platform owners introduce first-party complements and how their strategy depends on the stage in the focal platform’s (and competing platforms’) lifecycle. Based on the empirical results we develop a formal model of a platform market with differentiated complements where platform owners can introduce first-party complements. Finally, we extend our model and our empirical analysis to allow for the platform owner to bundle the platform with one of its complements, to study if platform owners can ensure the success of their platform in different stages of its lifecycle through bundling. Our project will make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the emerging literature in strategic management on platform markets.
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批准号:218903575
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项目类别:Research Grants
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2012
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负责人:Professor Dr. Tobias Kretschmer, Ph.D.
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依托单位:
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批准号:60773114
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项目类别:面上项目
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资助金额:28.0万元
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