Analysis of Funding and Expenditure for Social Capital Enhancement : An Experimental Economics Approach

我们的研究成果分为两类：实验研究和理论研究。在实验研究中，我们有四个主题：(1)作为社会资本积累支出手段的竞价竞价制度。(2)公共物品供给的成本分担；(3)社会资本特有的“公地”特性导致的效率低下；(4)收入分配的分配公平。我们还找到了新的有限竞价制度有效的环境。一个例子是外部竞标者：一旦我们包括一个不能加入Dango的竞标者，那么其他竞标者往往不会相互交谈，合同价格变得非常接近竞争性价格。在公共物品实验中，我们测试了自愿贡献机制、关键机制和沃克机制等几种人工机制。我们的发现与理论预测相去甚远。众所周知，“公地”的消散速度比纳什均衡预测的更快。我们发现导致这一结果的两个重要理论原则：份额最大化和差异最大化。我们还对收入分配进行了实证分析，观察了主体如何在几个规范性原则中选择一个。在理论研究中，我们处理了五个问题：(1)公共产品融资自愿贡献机制的特征；(2)具有经济意义的机制设计；(3)监管机构无法遵守的技术参数的主观分布的定义；(4)福利经济学的基本定理；(5)有限理性下的决策。更多细节见研究成果报告中的总结部分。

We have two categories of results : experimental and theoretical researches. In experimental rescarch, we have four topics : (1) the competitive bidding system as a mean of expenditure for social capital accumulation. (2) cost sharing for public goods supplies, (3) inefficiency due to the 'commons' that is a specific feature of social capital, and (4) distributive justice in income distribution.In competitive bidding, we proved that the designated competitive bidding is inefficient in experiments. We also found the environments where the new limited competitive bidding system is effecient. One example is an outside bidder : once we include a bidder who cannot join the 'Dango, ' then the rest of the bidders tend not to talk to each other and the contract price becomes very close to the competitive price. In public goods experiments, we tested several artificial mechanisms such as the voluntary contribution mechanism, the pivotal mechanism, and the Walker mechanism. What we found are far from theoretical predictions. It is well known that the 'commons' is dissipated more rapidly than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We found two important theoretical principles giving rise to this result : share maximization and difference maximization. We also conducted positive analysis of income distribution, observing how subjects choose one of several normative principles.In theoretical research, we treated five topics : (1) the characterization of the voluntary contribution mechanism for financing public goods, (2) economically meaningful mechanism designs, (3) definition of the subjective distribution of a technological parameter that cannot be observed by a regulator, (4) fundamental theorems in welfare economics, and (5) decision making under bounded rationality. For further details, please see the summary section in the report of research results.