The Effects and the Design of Incentives in Dynamic, Non-Repeated Principal-Agent Models

本项目旨在分析动态委托代理模型中激励的效果和最优设计，而不是重复博弈模型。特别是，如果以及当更强的激励对代理人的努力产生负面影响并阻碍或推迟成功时，应该进行分析。此外，应该分析如果不能排除重新谈判的可能性，委托人如何最优地设计跨期激励。将开发一个模型，使我们能够捕获动态的、非重复的委托代理关系。它的分析将提供一些新的和重要的见解，这些见解从理论和实践的角度都是相关的。例如，该模型可以解释为什么许多措施和项目被推迟或不必要的失败。因此，目前的研究项目将大大有助于更好地了解动态奖励制度的影响和设计。

This project seeks to analyze the effects and optimal design of incentives in dynamic principal-agent models, that are not modeled as repeated games. In particular, it should be analyzed if and when stronger incentives have negative effects on agents' efforts and deter or defer success. Furthermore, it should be analyzed how a principal optimally designs intertemporal incentives if renegotiations cannot be ruled out. A model that allows us to capture dynamic, non-repeated principal-agent relationships will be developed. Its analysis will deliver several new and important insights, which are relevant from a theoretical as well as a practical perspective. The model could, for example, explain why many measures and projects are delayed or unnecessary fail. The present research project would thus significantly contribute to a better understanding of the effects and design of dynamic incentive systems.