A Theoretical Research of Illocutionary Force within a Framework of a General Theory of Speech Acts

为了发展言语行为的一般理论，我们需要一种方法来描述一般言外行为的力量和内容。我们不仅要能描述陈述、报告、主张等，而且要能描述命令、请求、承诺等。我通过概括所谓的奥斯汀式的真理解释，发展了一种内容理论。当一个以言行事的行为被说明性惯例与之相联系的情景是与用来通过描述性惯例来执行该行为的句子相联系的那种情景时，就可以说该行为得到了满足。不同的以言行事行为以不同的方式得到满足。当满足时，陈述是真实的，命令被遵守，承诺被遵守。我的内容理论尊重这种异质性，将内容视为异质的，即不是力中性的。在本项目中，我试图在一般行动理论的框架内发展一种一般的言外之力理论，这种理论将行动视为改变环境某些特征的东西。这一框架可以提供一个比较处理的不同约定效果的各种施事行为。我也试图通过用情景理论的语言来阐述假设和结果，将这两个结果整合到一个关于言外行为的一般理论中。

In order to develop a general theory of speech acts'we need a way to characterize force and content of illocutionary acts in general. We have tobe able to characterize not only statements, reports, claims, etc.but also orders, requests, promises, etc. I have developped a theory of content by generalizing the so-called Austinian account of truth. An illocutionary Act is said to be satisfied when the situation to which it is connected by the demonstarative conventions is of the type which is associated with the sentence used to perform it by the descriptive conventions. Different illocutionary acts are satisfied in different ways. When satisfied, statements are true, orders are obeyed, and promises are kept. My theory of content respects this heterogeneity by treating content as hetergeneous, i.e.not force-neutral.In the present project, I have tried to develop a general theory of illocutionary force within a framework ofa general theory of action which treat action as something that changes certain features of circumstance. This framework can provide a comparative treatment of different conventional effectsof various illocutionary acts. I alsohave tried to integrate both of theseresults into a general theory of illocutionary acts by formulating hypotheses and results in the language of situation theory.