Structural models of decision heuristics under uncertainty

研究了N人博弈情境下决策推理与选择公理之间的结构关系。在这项研究中使用的实验游戏是2套39个游戏的线性回报和逐步的回报在3人和11人的框架。从132名被试的选择反应、选择困难、选择原因等方面对结果进行分析。分析表明，博弈情境可分为排他性困境和等价性困境两大类。一些游戏，如CABA和CBCA，这是不同的社会困境游戏（DBCA）在某些方面，被发现有高度有趣的功能。它们既有排他性困境的成分，又有对等困境的成分。受试者对这些游戏的评价比社会困境游戏更难决定选择哪一个。我们进一步构造了一个新的衡量两难结构程度的指标。这个指数被发现非常解释的主题的评价困难的决定在游戏的情况。

The present study researched the structural relationship between the decision heuristics and the choice axioms in the N-person game situations. The experimental games used in this study are 2 sets of 39 games with linear payoffs and step-wise payoffs in the 3-person and 11-person frameworks. The results were analyzed from the following aspects : the subjects'choice responses, the difficulties of choosing, and the choice reasons described by 132 subjects. The analysis showed that the game situations should be divided into two categories of exclusiveness dilemmas and equivalence dilemmas. Some games such as CABA and CBCA,which are different from the social dilemma game (DBCA) in some aspects, were found to have highly interesting features. They are consisted of not only the element of the exclusiveness dilemma but slso the element of the equivalence dilemma. The subjects evaluated those games very difficult to decide which to choose than the social dilemma game. We have further constructed a new index to count the degree of dilemma structure. This index was found very explanatory of the subjects'evaluation of the difficulties of the decisions in game situations.