A Theory of Plausibility

传统的信息稀缺问题需要可废止推理(缺省推理、非单调推理)的方法。最近的信息过载问题在我们的“后真相时代”变得特别紧迫，它要求采取方法理性地修改信仰和意见。我想表明，似是而非的理论提供了应对信息稀缺和信息过载问题所需的资源。我的目标是将“似是而非”放在基本哲学术语的地图上。这本专著旨在发展一种全面的关于似是而非的哲学理论，将信念的模型和期望的模型统一在单一的表示模式中。除其他外，它涵盖(1)信仰和信仰状态的表征；(2)可废止推理和信仰修正的哲学基础，将似然性解释为道教偏好；(3)面对不完美的歧视(不可区分、可忽略)、不可比较(不可通约、多维度)和语境影响时的理性“道教选择”；(4)对认知状态的定性表征和定量表征及其动态之间关系的思考。然而，定量表示法(概率、排名)也将被讨论，帮助我们理解定性方面的重要原则的地位。

The traditional problem of information scarcity calls for methods of defeasible reasoning (default reasoning, "non-monotonic" reasoning). The more recent problem of information overload, which has become particularly pressing in our "post-truth era", calls for methods for the rational revision of beliefs and opinions. I want to show that a theory of plausibility offers the resources that are needed to cope with both the problem of information scarcity and the problem of information overload. I aim at putting "plausibility" on the map of fundamental philosophical terms.The intended monograph aims at developing a comprehensive philosophical theory of plausibility that unifies a model for beliefs and a model for expectations within a single mode of representation. It covers, among other things,(i) the representation of beliefs and belief states;(ii) the philosophy underlying defeasible reasoning and belief revision, interpreting plausibility as doxastic preference;(iii) rational `doxastic choices' in the face of imperfect discrimination (indistinguishability, negligibility), incomparability (incommensurability, multi-dimensionality) and context effects;(iv) reflections on the relation between qualitative representations of cognitive states and quantitative representations as well as their dynamics.The approach of the project is decidedly qualitative; it covers categorical belief and categorical expectation as well as comparative strengths of belief and expectation. However, quantitative representations (probabilities, rankings) will also be discussed that help us understand the status of important principles of the qualitative side.