Stoic Logic of Language With Chrysippus and Beyond

1935年，Łukasiewicz让科学界相信，与亚里士多德逻辑相比，斯多葛学派的逻辑会有很大的不同。因此，密集的调查开始了，主要是从20世纪60年代及以后。鉴于资料来源不完整，研究工作是如此有效，以至于剩馀的问题往往似乎被抛在后面。然而，在过去的几年里，斯多葛辩证法的研究重新出现。斯多葛学派的《语言逻辑与克利西普斯及以后》项目加入了斯多葛学派对谓词的理解，研究了其在克利西普斯之外的发展。因此，它展示了对象构成问题的分析方法是如何在斯多葛学派中发生变化的，直到现代逻辑能够理解它，以及它的困难。该项目依赖于两个支柱：一个是对谓词的斯多葛式定义和相关解释。这一重大挑战表明，关于对先知的理解，《斯托阿》中的学说有了发展。第二，为了澄清发展范围，不相关的独特地位将讨论；他们涉及到详细的问题，并在Stoa发展，部分已经在金色之前，部分由金色自己。只是这些立场，然而，需要进一步考虑，和后金西比的斯多葛派逻辑学家大概试图超越这些立场。然而，在所有情况下，适当的修订都需要以某种方式修改谓词的概念，朝着各自的斯多葛学派定义之一所示的方向。具体而言，讨论中的问题或观点将是：齐诺的怀疑，反对在法庭上双方在形成判决之前都应该听取的规则；金西普斯对指示性指示代词和斯多葛式的命题划分的不满意的分析；金西普斯不愿使用量词，并由我解释他的逻辑也是亚里士多德的三段论；以及论证图式。因此，(A)关于时间和内容的谓词的发展将是可能的，(B)更详细地解释如何构思支柱-2<位置的修订过程，以及(C)收集一些附加值，例如，更近距离地理解斯多葛学派关于共性的观点。此外，(D)不仅可以证明后克里西比的谓词概念与弗雷吉的函数概念的亲和力，而且可以根据斯多葛的案例概念来考察弗雷格的相关论证概念。至少在这里，问题出现了斯多葛学派和现代逻辑对对象的构成有什么看法。

In 1935 Łukasiewicz convinced the scientific community that Stoic logic in comparison with Aristotelian logic would be significantly different. Hence, intensive investigations started, mainly since the nineteen-sixties and after. In view of the fragmentary sources the research work was so effective that remaining questions very often appear to recede into the background. During the last years, however, the studies in Stoic dialectics re-emerged. The project »Stoic Logic of Language With Chrysippus and Beyond« joins in the Stoics' understanding of predicates, studying its development beyond Chrysippus. Thus, it shows how the analytical approach to the question of the constitution of objects changed in Stoicism, until modern logic could pick it up, together with its difficulties.The project relies on two pillars: one, the Stoic definitions, and connected explanations, of the predicate. This material challenges to demonstrate that concerning the understanding of predi-cates there was a development in doctrine within the Stoa. Two, to clarify the developmental scope, unrelated distinctive positions will be discussed; they related to detailed issues, and were developed in the Stoa, partly already before Chrysippus, partly by Chrysippus himself. Just these positions, yet, required further consideration, and post-Chrysippean Stoic logicians presumably tried to surpass those positions. In all cases, however, adequate revisions would require to modify the concept of predicate somehow, in that very direction shown by one of the respective Stoic definitions. In detail the issues or views under discussion will be: the doubts Zeno of Citium developed against the rule that in the lawcourt before forming a judgment both of the parties should be heard; Chrysippus' dissatisfying analysis of deictic demonstrative pronouns and the Stoic division of propositions; Chrysippus' hesitation to use quantifiers, and to interprete by me-ans of his logic also Aristotelian syllogisms; and schemata of arguments.Having elaborated the two ›pillars‹ as indicated, the findings will be brought together. Therewith it will be possible (a) to specify the development concerning predicates, regarding time and content, (b) to explain in greater detail how to conceive the revising processes of the ›pillar-2‹ positions, and (c) to collect some added value, e.g. a closer understanding of the Stoics' view on universals. In addition, (d) it will be possible not only to demonstrate the affinity of the post-chrysippean predicate-concept to Fregee's concept of function, but also to examine Frege's related concept of argument in the light of the Stoic concept of cases. It is here, at the latest, that the question arises what the Stoic and what the modern logic have to say about the constitution of objects.