A Experimental Study of Auditing Effectiveness

本研究的目的是检验通过审计购买在经理和投资者之间传递信息的程度。我们提出了一个基于信令和廉价谈话游戏的简单模型。我们试图做的是论证审计不可靠性在多大程度上是可以接受的，以及环境变化对审计可信度的影响有多大。我们还考察了不同的审计购买成本如何影响投资者和管理者的行为。它预测，审计购买成本越高，越容易达到分离均衡，在这种均衡中，任何不努力的管理者都不再购买审计。我们还在两个实验室环境中对其进行了调查，第一个是在两个实验室市场；是否有审计；第二是在三个市场：审计是不可用的还是可用的，但以两种不同的审计购买成本。在这两个实验中，在有审计的市场上，经理们比在没有审计的市场上选择了更多的努力。前者市场的投资者比后者的投资者更频繁地投资。这表明，尽管投资者对审计购买的可靠性存在怀疑，但管理层对审计购买给予了很大的信任。在第二个实验中，与我们的预测相反，投资者在较高的审计购买成本下进行投资的频率较低。经理们也不那么频繁地做出努力。他们试图更多地欺骗投资者，而投资者后来证明是防御性的，不进行投资。或许，经理们发现吸引投资者信任的总增量成本太高了。因此，他们希望省去努力或审计采购的成本。面对这种选择，他们选择的是减少前者，更本质的选择。这导致了投资者的叛逃。

The aim of this research is to examine how far the information transmission through the audit purchase works between a manager and investors. We propose a simple model based on signaling and cheap talk games. What we try to do is to demonstrate to what degree the audit unreliability will be acceptable and how much the environmental change affects the audit credibility. We also examine how the different audit purchasings costs influence the behavior of investors and managers. It predicts that the higher the audit purchasings cost is, the easier is it to obtain the separating equilibrium, in which any manager who makes no effort no longer purchases an audit. We also investigate it in two laboratory settings, first in two laboratory markets ; whether auditing is available or not, second in three markets : whether auditing is unavailable or available but at two different audit purchasings costs. In both experiments managers in the market where auditing available have chosen much more effort than where auditing unavailable. Investors in the former market have invested more often than in the latter. It shows that the managers give much trust to the audit purchase, despite of investors doubt about its reliability. In the second experiment, contrary to our prediction, investors invest less often at the high audit purchasings cost. Managers also make an effort less frequently. They try to cheat more often the investors, who turn out to be defensive and refrain from the investment. Perhaps managers find too high the total incremental costs of inducing trust on the part of the investors. They thus want to spare the cost of effort or audit purchase. Facing with this alternative, what they have chosen is to cut down on the former, more essential one. That causes investor's defections.