Economic Analysis of Institutions for Transactions of Information

该项目的目的是从经济角度调查信息和信息商品交易的替代机构的职能。与会者提请注意复制信息的成本、保护信息不被复制的成本以及保护信息所有权的成本（即：例如，知识产权）。本研究的最终目的是为改善现有的信息交易制度，并为建立能够促进信息和信息商品的有效生产和交易的新制度做出贡献。考虑了三个经济主体：（1）信息生产者，他最大限度地提高了出售他生产的信息的收入与信息生产和保护信息的成本之间的差异。 ...更多信息 在信息生产技术和防复制技术的条件下，信息复制者，最大化出售（复制）信息的收入和复制原始信息的成本之间的差异，以及信息用户，最大化他从购买和使用原始或二手信息中获得的效用。其次，通过列举模型分析的影响因素，探讨了设计理想的信息交易制度（包括保护信息所有权的程度和方式）的理论框架。特别是，从新信息中获得的社会效益，生产和再生产的社会成本（即，例如，复制）信息的社会成本、保护信息不被复制的社会成本、破坏信息保护的社会成本以及激励信息生产的必要性。在建立这样一个模型会出现的一些问题被确定。得出的结论是，一般的理论方法来解决这个问题将是困难的，实际的方法，如蒙特卡罗研究将是更合适的。少

The objective of this project was to investigate from the economic standpoint the function of alternative institutions for transactions of information and information goods. Attention was drawn to the presence of the cost of copying information, the cost of protecting information from being copied, and the cost of protecting the right of information ownership (i. e., the intellectual property right). Ultimately, this project intends to contribute to improving existing institutions for transactions of information and to creating new institutions which can facilitate efficient production and transactions of information and information goods.A model to explain the process of production, transaction, and usage of information and information goods was constructed. Three economic agents were considered : (i) the producer of information, who maximizes the difference of revenues from selling information he produced and the costs of information production and protection of information from bein … More g copied, given technology of information production and technology of copy prevention, (ii) the copier of information, who maximizes the difference of revenues from selling (copied) information and the costs of copying original information, and (iii) the user of information, who maximizes his utility obtained from purchasing and using original or secondary information. An equilibrium in the market in which information is transacted by these three agents was investigated.Second, a theoretical framework of designing desirable institutions for information transactions (including the extent as well as the mode of protecting ownership of information) was investigated by itemizing factors affecting model analysis. In particular, the social benefit obtained from new information, the social cost of producing and reproducing (i. e., copying) information, the social cost of protecting information from being copied, the social cost of breaking information protection, and the need of incentives for information production were considered. Some of the problems which would arise in building such a model are identified. It is concluded that a general theoretical approach to this problem would be difficult ; practical methods such as Monte Carlo study would be more appropriate. Less