Crisis of Free Trade Regime and New Trade Rule

本项目主要由三部分组成：1.；国际贸易在国际贸易中的应用（与李国强合著），第2期。关贸总协定背景下的国际战略政策相互依存（与J. Eaton合著）；动态优化框架下各种政策的国际溢出效应（与池田、柴田等合作）研究了一个竞争部门和一个古诺寡头垄断部门的两国模型。如果在寡头垄断部门允许自由进入，则要素价格均等化和比较优势的标准结果都成立。此外，除了从贸易中获得标准收益外，开放贸易还通过降低垄断程度使一个国家受益。其次，利用具有内生研发投资和寡头之间边际成本差异的寡头垄断模型，考察了消除一家企业对世界福利的影响。令人惊讶的是，垄断比古诺双头垄断带来更高的世界福利。关贸总协定批准的出口国报复的威胁使出口国和进口国建立贸易管理协定都是有利的。2 .通过设计一种使其无谓损失适当分配给它们的贸易协定，它们避免了关贸总协定批准的造成额外无谓损失的报复。通过将动态优化行为应用于两国经济，探讨了各种政策（如财政支出、资产持有税、公司税等）和供给侧冲击对消费路径、外国资产头寸和各国福利的影响。福利效应包括跨期贸易条件（相对价格）效应和跨期贸易条件（利率）效应。因此，即使一个国家的政策促进了进口并改善了外国的贸易条件，该国的情况也可能因其外国资产状况而恶化。

This project consists of three parts : 1. International Trade in an Oligopolistic Open Economy (with S. Lahiri), 2. International Strategic Policy Interdependence in the Context of the GATT Regime (with J. Eaton), and 3. International Spill-Over Effects of Various Policies in a Dynamic Optimization Framework (with S. Ikeda, A. Shibata, etc.).1. A two-country model with one competitive and one Cournot-oligopolistic sector is examined. If free entry is allowed in the oligopoly sector, both factor price equalization and the standard result on comparative advantage hold. Furthermore, in addition to the standard gains from trade, opening trade benefits a country through a reduction in the degree of monopoly. Next, using an oligopoly model with endogenous R&D investment and a marginal-cost differential between oligopolists, the effect of eliminating a firm on the world welfare is examined. Surprisingly, monopoly results in a higher world welfare than Cournot duopoly.2. The threat of the exporting country's retaliation approved by GATT makes it advantageous for both the exporting and importing countries to establish an OMA. By designing an OMA under which its deadweight loss is appropriately distributed to them, they avoid the retaliation approved by GATT which causes an additional deadweight loss.3. By applying dynamic optimization behavior to a two-country economy, the effects of various policies (e.g. fiscal spending, an asset-holding tax, a corporate tax, etc.) and supply-side shocks on the paths of consumption, foreign asset position and each country's welfare are explored. The welfare effect consists of the intratemporal terms-of trade (the relative price) effect and the intertemporal terms-of-trade (the interest rate) effect. Thus, even if a country's policy promotes import and improves a foreign country's terms of trade, the foreign country may be worse off depending on its foreign asset position.