The Thought of Henry of Ghent in the Last Quarter of the 13th Century in the Latin West

这个项目使根特的亨利(1240？-1293)的思想为日本人所知，同时也揭示了哲学史上几乎被忽略的一个时期。这个项目的目的是在先前的研究和特别是欧洲学者正在进行的调查的基础上，建议对亨利的本体论和认识论进行统一的解释，这两个问题在拉丁西方13世纪最后25年的哲学背景下被分开对待。1994年，我们通过考察罗马的贾尔斯、根特的亨利和方丹的戈德弗雷关于本质与存在的区别的思想，对这一时期进行了概括性的考察。贾尔斯主张真正区分本质和存在，亨利意图区分，戈弗雷真正的同一性。1995年，我们研究了亨利的本体论，首先，考察了他的“雷斯”和“esse”概念本身，其次，将他的“esse”与托马斯·阿奎那的“esse”进行了比较。亨利和阿奎那在“esse”和“esse”之间有共同的区别，esse表示一个命题的构成或真理，而esse表示绝对的现实。但亨利将后者进一步划分为“本质存在”和“存在存在”，摧毁并失去了阿奎那对直言“本质”的完整意义。1996年，我们从统一的角度讨论了亨利的本体论和认识论。我们指出了亨利的启蒙理论与邓斯·斯科特斯的存在的单一性相对照的一个主要问题，并为解决这个问题提出了我们独到的观点，即关键在于亨利的绝对本质实在论。

This project makes the thought of Henry of Ghent (1240? -1293) known to Japanese people, and at the same time casts light on a period which has been almost passed over in the history of philosophy. The purpose of this project is to propose, based on preceded studies and ongoing investigation by especially European scholars, a unified interpretation of Henry's ontology and epistemology, which have been treated separately, in the philosophical context of the last quarter of the 13th century in the Latin West. We have achieved our purpose by doing the following researches during the term of project.In 1994 we took a general view of the period by considering the thought of Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines about the distinction between essence and being. Giles took the position of real distinction between essence and being, Henry intentioal distinction, and Godfrey real identity. In 1995 we considered Henry's ontology by, first, investigating his conception of 'res' and 'esse' in itself and, secondly, contrasting his 'esse' with Thomas Aquinas' one. Henry and Aquinas had in common the distinction between 'esse' which signifies composition or truth of a proposition and 'esse' which signifies the categorical reality. But Henry further divided the latter into 'esse essentiae' and 'esse existentiae', destroying and losing Aquinas' full meaning of the categorical 'esse'. In 1996 we interpeted Henry's ontology and epistemology from a unified point of view. We pointed out a principal problem underlying Henry's illumination theory in contrast with Duns Scotus' univocity of being, and in order to solve it proposed our original viewpoint that the key is in Henry's realism of absolute essence.