Naturalizing the mind in terms of teleological functionalism

这个项目的目的是根据目的论功能主义将我们的思想自然化，它将思想视为一种使我们能够适应环境的工具。特别是，我试图解决归化意向性和意识所产生的问题。结果如下：命题态度如信念、欲望等具有句法结构，受逻辑推理支配，而脑状态则缺乏句法结构，受动态模式转换支配。因此，命题态度不是由某种大脑状态单独实现的，至多是由所有大脑状态全部实现的。但有意识的命题态度是通过运动皮层的某种话语或神经激活模式单独实现的。理性是命题态度的组成部分。它不是法理学的，因为它不能作为一套原则加以限定。因此命题态度的目的论功能不是法理的。这表明一个行为的主要原因不是它的原因。它导致了对行为因果理论的反驳。然而，目的论函数是可以通过一些连接类型的机制来实现的，因此它们不是不可自然化的函数。感觉品质或所谓的意识心理状态的感觉是有争议的，不是它们的内在属性，而是包含它们的意图内容。因此，有必要重新解释疼痛的经历，例如，将疼痛的属性解释为故意的，将疼痛的属性解释为客观的。这种重新解读并非不可能。

The purpose of this project is to naturalize our minds in terms of telelogical functionalism, which views a mind as a device of enabling us to adapt to the environment. In particular, I tried to solve the problems which occurs from naturalizing intentionality and consciousness. The results are the follwing.1. Proposituinal attitudes such as beliefs and desires have syntactical structure and are governed by logical inference while brain states lack syntactical structure and are governed by dynamical pattern transformation as connectionists suggest. So it follows that propositional attitudes are not realized individually by some brain state, at most being realized wholly by the total of brain states. But conscious propositional attitudes are realized individually by some utterance or neural activation pattern in motor cortex.2. Ratinality is constitutive of propositional attitudes. It is not nomological since it is not condifiable as a set of principles. So it follows that the telelogical functions of propositional attitudes are not nomological. This shows that the primary reason of an action is not its cause. It leads to the refutation of the causal theory of action. Nonetheless the telelogical functions are realisable by some mechnisms of connections type so that they are not unnaturalizable functions.3. Sensory qualities or so-called qualia of conscious mental states are arguable not their intrinsic properties but comprise their intentional contents. So it is necessary to reinterprete an experience of pain, for example, as intentional and the property of having a pain as objective. This reintepretation is not impossible.