Research on economic theory of anti-trust law

在我们两年的研究中获得的业绩如下：(1)分析了基于信息激励的一般监管制度优化设计。特别是，我们发现了等级管制比直接管制更有效的条件。(2)在重复竞争博弈下，考虑卡特尔威慑的执行政策。明确了处罚政策和监督政策的结构。(3)从反垄断法的角度对公开招标规则进行评价。研究表明，在可能存在共谋的情况下，参与者的研究价格低于竞争市场。(4)对寡头垄断市场下的横向并购进行了福利分析。当并购产生负协同效应时，针对低效率企业的并购会增加社会福利。(5)分析了排他性交易的效率问题，认为排他性交易是合作投资中的阻碍问题。结果表明，当进入者具有市场力量且不可能进行重新谈判时，预期损害赔偿规则比违约损害赔偿规则诱导的交易效率更高。(6)从福利分析的角度考察了捆绑销售的非法性。在一个市场中拥有市场力量的企业有对另一个市场，特别是垂直市场产生影响并增加社会福利的趋势。

Performances obtained in our two-year research were as follows.(1)An optimal design of general regulatory system was analysed on the basis of information and incentive approach. In particular, the condition under where a hierachical regulation was more efficient than a direct regulation was found.(2)An enforcement policy of cartel deterrence was considered under a repeated competition game. The structure of penalty policy and monitoring policy was explicitly showned.(3)Public bidding rules was evaluated form the point of view of anti-trust law. Researvation prices of the participants was showned to become lower than in the case of competitive market in the case that collusion was possible.(4)An welfare analysis of horizontal merger in an oligopolistic market was done. An acquisitonagainst inefficient firm was showned to increase the social welfare when negative synergy effect of merger existed.(5)The efficiency problem of exclusive dealings was analysed as a hold-up problem in cooperative investment. As result, expected damage rule was showned to induce more efficient transaction than liquidated damage rule when entrants had market power and the renegotitiation was impossible.(6)Illegality of tying in sale was examined from the point of view of welfare analysis. A firm with a market power in a market was showned to have a trend to make an influence on another market, in particular , a vertical market and increase the social welfare.