Stock Options at a Combined Corporation

本文作者认为，与大多数人的观点相反，在新的股票期权制度下，子公司的董事和员工不会被授予母公司的股票期权。原因如下：(1)虽然原有的股票期权制度仅限于董事和员工，但新的股票期权制度以“任何非股东”取代了这一明确的措辞。删除限制条款是在经济领域的强烈要求下完成的。这一行动被解读为有可能向任何人授予股票期权，由公司自行决定。我担心这样的解释是否恰当。(2)根据另一条新法例，董事薪酬的定义已因应实际情况而有所改善。然而，根据多数人的意见，关于股票期权的规则是在一个独立的制度下提供的。在这种思维方式下，这样的规则确实…更不影响报酬的计算。以前的股票期权制度对公司自有股份和优先购买权规定了不同的规则。本次修订对这些事项进行了梳理和整合，明确了股票期权的目的和内容。股票期权是一种旨在提高发行公司股票价格的激励性薪酬。出于这一目的，不允许将股票期权授予与股价上涨无关的人。可以获得股票期权的人的范围似乎已经变得无限，但考虑到制度框架，得出的结论是，实际上确实存在一些限制。(3)商法的修改延伸到对母子公司的定义规定的改变。这一变化是从形式标准到实质要求，即获得总投票权的多数。这次修订可以说是划时代的，因为它比以前更能反映现实情况。然而，母公司和子公司的法律独立地位并没有改变。每个组织都有自己的组织，并做出自己的决定。(当母公司拥有子公司100%的股票时，可以考虑特殊情况。)然而，除了全资子公司外，如果母公司向子公司的董事发行自己股票的期权，发行机构与董事负责的实际公司完全不同。据说，股票期权的目标是每个独立公司的股票，它的目的是促进股票价格的上涨。因此，从母公司和子公司的法律独立性角度来看，对被授予股票期权的人进行限制是合理的。(4)此外，合并后公司的董事作为诚实的经理对所属公司负有忠诚义务和注意义务。例如，当一家子公司的董事出于股票期权的目的收购母公司发行的股票时，母公司通常会赋予它有助于股票增值的预期业绩。满足这样的期望可能意味着董事违反了他对子公司的一般职责。因此，从理论上讲，母公司向子公司董事提供股票期权助长了渎职违法行为。很明显，法律制度不可能有这样的目的。(5)在许多情况下，董事负责合并公司的各种职位。在这种情况下，有必要对共同公司的利益冲突进行批准。只有在获得批准的情况下，才能例外地授予股票期权。在股东大会上批准授予股票期权的决议，董事有义务披露归属的理由，但我认为，在这种情况下，他们必须解释理由，才能获得对利益冲突的批准。(6)合并被认为是公司最强大的结合，财产的全面转移是法律上重要的效果。那么，在新制度下的股票期权的情况下，新股预留的有利问题将涉及什么样的待遇？合并的法律后果是，继承公司继承解散公司的所有权利和义务。新股预留权是义务的一种，继任公司对新股预留也承担义务。在预估值极低的情况下，通过申请债权人的反对意见，新的股票保留权利持有人得到了保护。较少

The writer of this research argues that, contrary to majority opinion, under the new system of stock options, directors and employees of subsidiaries are not to be vested with stock options of the parent company. The reasons are as follows :(1) Although the former system limited stock options to directors and employees, the new stock option system replaces this explicit language with "anyone who is not a stockholder." Deletion of the limiting provision was accomplished by strong requests from the economic sphere. The action came to be interpreted in a way that makes it possible to grant stock options to anyone, at the company's discretion. I have concerns about whether such an interpretation is appropriate.(2) Under another new law, the definition of remuneration of directors has been improved to take account of the actual circumstances. According to majority opinion, however, the rules on stock options are provided under an independent system. Under that way of thinking, such rules do … More not affect calculation of remuneration.The former stock option system provided for different rules for company self-owned shares and pre-emptive rights. The current revision organizes and integrates these matters and clarifies the purpose and content of stock options. Stock options are an incentive remuneration that aims to increase the stock price of an issuing company. Because of this purpose, vesting stock options in those who are unrelated to increase in the stock price is not allowed. The scope of those who could be vested with stock options has become seemingly unlimited, but consideration of the institutional framework leads to the conclusion that some limits do, in fact, exist.(3) The revision of commercial law extends to making a change in definitional provisions concerning parent-subsidiary corporations. The change is from a formal standard to a substantial requirement, which is acquisition of a majority of total voting rights. This revision can be evaluated as epoch-making since it reflects real circumstances more than before. There is, however, no change in the status of parent and subsidiary corporations as legally independent. Each has its own organization and makes its own decisions. (It is possible to consider exceptional circumstances when the parent owns 100% of the subsidiary's stock.)Apart from wholly-owned subsidiaries, however, if the parent company issues options of its own stock to directors of a subsidiary, the issuing body is completely different than the actual company to which the director is responsible. It is said that stock options, which aim to contribute to the increase of stock price, target the stock of each independent corporation. Thus, the limitation of those to be vested with stock options is justified from the perspective of legal independence of parent and subsidiary corporations.(4) Moreover, a director at a combined corporation has a duty of loyalty and duty of care as an honest manager towards the company to which he belongs. For instance, when a director of a subsidiary corporation acquires stock issued by a parent corporation for the purpose of stock option, it is usual that parent corporation vests it expecting performance that makes for an increase in stock value. Satisfying such expectations may mean that the director violates his general duty to the subsidiary. Therefore, in theory, a parent corporation's providing stock options in a director of a subsidiary corporation encourages the illegal act of neglect of duty. It is obvious that the legal system could not have had such a purpose.(5) In many cases, directors are in charge of various positions at combined corporation. In such cases, it is necessary to have an approval on conflicts of interests at mutual companies. Vesting stock options is allowed exceptionally only if there is such approval. For approval of a resolution of vesting stock option at the general meeting directors have a duty to disclose the reasons for vesting but my opinion is that in such a case they have to explain the reasons in order to obtain approval over conflict of interests.(6) Merger is said to be the strongest combination of corporations, and comprehensive transfer of property is a legally important effect. Then, in case of stock options under the new system what kind of treatment will be involved with the advantageous issue of new stock reservations? The legal consequence of merger is that the succeeding company succeeds to all the rights and duties of the dissolving company. The new stock reservation right is one kind of obligation, so succeeding companies succeed to duties on new stock reservation rights too. The new stock reservation right holders are protected through filing a petition for creditors' objections when the estimate is extremely low. Less