Nuclear Weapons and Japan : Atomic policies of the Kishi Administration, 1957-1960

这个项目是关于1957年至1960年岸上政府时期核武器在日本战后外交关系和国内政治中的作用。根据对英国和美国解密的外交文件的仔细检查，仔细的经验和历史调查表明，岸上政府采取了复杂的矛盾政策。岸信介首相公开支持日本国内反对美、英、苏进行核试验的运动，但同时明确主张日本未来在和平宪法框架内拥有核武器。虽然岸信介似乎意识到，她不可能生产或拥有战略核力量，但很明显，岸信介非常关注小型战术核武器，他有时将其称为“清洁核武器”。这种矛盾心态在他的政策形式…中保持了一致性。因为他最重要的政治目标是完成日本的独立。为此，必须动员日本反核舆论中的一些民族主义情绪。但与此同时，拥有战术核武器肯定是为了减少日本对美国的军事依赖。另一个发现是，日本政府对美国和英国进行的核试验表示抗议，根本没有诚意和诚意。在岸上时期，政府多次传达了国会通过的决议，要求美国人和英国人在1957年通过测试。但就连岸信介本人也表示，就在英国在圣诞群岛进行核试验之前，日本可以在不违反宪法第9条的情况下拥有核武器。此外，实际上将抗议活动交给华盛顿或伦敦的相反群体的日本外交官通常表示，他们不应该把这些抗议活动当回事。自然，美国和英国官员没有太多关注日本的抗议运动，他们认为这些运动不是真实的或真诚的。最后，20世纪50年代末的英日原子能合作谈判似乎在日本支持核能的领导人的政策构想中发挥了非常重要的作用。虽然美国人可以通过控制供应给日本人的浓缩铀数量来阻止日本人制造自己的核武器，但他们可以从英国的考德霍尔型反应堆获得一定数量的钚。由于英日谈判的结果，日本人最终从英国购买了考德霍尔反应堆，知道该反应堆是用于民用和军事目的。人们很自然地认为，日本领导人可以寻找一种方法，使他们的国家在军事上减少核化。

This project deals with the role of nuclear weapons in Japan's post war foreign relations and domestic politics during the period of the Kishi administration from 1957 to 1960. Careful empirical and historical investigations based upon close examinations of the diplomatic documents declassified in Britain and the United States suggest that the Kishi administration adopted complicated policies of ambivalent nature. Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke supported openly the movements in Japan against nuclear tests conducted by the US, Britain and the Soviet Union., but at the same time, he clearly advocated Japan's future possession of nuclear weapons within the framework of the peaceful constitution. While he seemed aware that it would be impossible for her to produce or possess strategic nuclear forces, it was clear that Kishi paid much attention to small size tactical nuclear weapons, which he sometimes called 'clean nuclear weapons'. This ambivalence was kept coherent within his policy formu … More la, because his most significant political aim was to complete Japan's independence. For the purpose, it was essential to mobilize some nationalist sentiments in Japanese anti-nuclear public opinion. But at the same time, possessing tactical nuclear weapons must have been supposed to reduce Japan's military dependence upon the United States. Another finding was that the Japanese government was not at all sincere or genuine in protesting against the nuclear tests conducted by the US and Britain. During the Kishi period, the government conveyed several times the resolutions passed in the diet which requested the Americans and the British to atop the tests in 1957. But even Kishi himself stated just before a British nuclear test in the Christmas islands that Japan could possess nuclear weapons without violating Article 9 of the constitution. Moreover the Japanese diplomats who actually handed the protests to the opposite numbers in Washington or London, usually saying that they should not take those protests seriously. It was natural that the US and British officials did not paid much attention to the Japanese protests movements which they did not regard genuine or sincere. Finally, the Anglo-Japanese negotiations for atomic energy cooperation during the late 1950s seem to have taken a very significant role in the policy conception held by the Japanese pro-nuclear leaders. Though the Americans could prevent the Japanese from even trying to produce their own nuclear weapons by controlling the amount of enriched uranium to supply the Japanese, they could expect to have certain amount of plutonium from the British Calder Hall type reactor. As the result of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations, the Japanese finally purchased the Calder Hall reactor from Britain knowing that the reactor was for civilian and military purposes. It is rather natural to assume that the Japanese leaders could search a way to make their country nuclearized in military terms Less