ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON THE JAPANESE CARE SERVICE MARKET WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

我们的研究有两个主要目的。一个是调查在日本护理服务市场上，提供者提供的服务质量是高还是低。日本的护理保险虽然具有准市场性质，但提供者受制于固定的价格体系，消费者面临着关于提供者的不完全信息。在这样的市场条件下，我们发现，提供商可以通过采用更高的固定价格的服务，通过调节质量规范，或通过教育消费者来提高他们的服务质量。另一个是探讨如何适当的方式来传播有关服务提供者提供的服务质量的信息。日本政府自2006年以来制定了关于护理服务提供者的信息自由法。但该法案没有对每个提供者提供的护理服务质量进行任何评价。我们介绍了福冈市和北九州市的第三方评估的例子。我们研究了一个基于消费者满意度分析的原创性评价体系。我们还没有完成新系统。

Our research has two major purposes. One is to investigate whether providers produce high or low quality service in the Japanese care service market. Though the Japanese Care Insurance has a kind of quasi-market, providers are subject to a fixed price system and consumers are faced with imperfect information about suppliers. Under these market conditions, we find that providers can put high quality on their service by adapting higher fixed price for service, by regulating quality norm, or by educating consumers. We also confirm these results by economic experiments.Another is to explore adequate manners how to diffuse information concerning quality of service a provider produces. The Japanese government has made a freedom of information act about care service provider since 2006. But the act does not give any evaluation for quality of care service each provider produces. We introduce examples of the third party assessment, in Fukuoka city and Kitakyushu city. We have studied an original evaluation system that is based on Consumer Satisfaction Analysis. We have not completed the new system yet.