Analysis on the roles of norms in repeated games and institutional design to deter collusion

与赵仁国合作的两篇文章已在国际期刊上发表。其中一篇发表在《经济理论杂志》上，题为《重复博弈中的学习抱负》，研究的是那些按照满意理论而不是最优化理论行事的玩家重复玩的游戏。它表明，合作是一种独特的结果，而不是民间理论。另一篇与山森、加藤和川口联合发表的文章已被《实验经济学》接受发表。我们进行了独裁者游戏的实验，研究了回报无关的声音对份额的影响。过去的研究声称，即使我们假设对方的偏好，声音也不重要。然而，如果我们用声音再现一种情况，声音在积极的意义上很重要，因为它增加了接受者的份额。

Two articles joint with In-Koo Cho have been published in international journals. One of them, entitled "Learning aspiration in repeated games" published in the Journal of Economic Theory, studies repeated games played by the players who behave according to satisficing theory, as opposed to optimizing theory. It shows that cooperation emerges as a unique outcome instead of the folk theorem.Another article joint with Yamamori, Kato, and Kawagoe has been accepted for publication in Experimental Economics. We conducted the experiment of dictator games and studied the effects of payoff-irrelevent voice on the share. The past studies claim that voice does not matter even if we assume other-regarding preferences. However, if we reproduce a situation with voice, voice matters in a positive way in the sense that it increases the share of the recipients.