Welfare Analyzes of Exchange Rate Regimes

本文从一个小型开放经济体的福利角度，从理论上分析了1990年代S汇率危机后，哪种汇率制度作为一种汇率制度是最优的。由于在浮动汇率制度和固定汇率制度之间采用中间汇率制度的国家爆发了危机，有人认为两极制度将在这些国家中占上风。我们构建了理论模型来比较福利水平的差异，同时考虑到选择最优汇率制度的难度。因为许多遭受危机打击的国家一直在遭受所谓的浮动汇率制恐惧和盯住美元的恐惧。该模型清楚地区分了法律上的政权和事实上的政权。我们对这些制度及其组合进行了福利比较，为了考虑和比较浮动制度和其他制度，我们不可避免地构建了一个三县模型。为我们的福利肛门…更重要的是，假设小国的损失函数与大国的损失函数相似。在该模型中，央行或政府被假定将失业和通胀造成的损失降至最低。国际收支不平衡是一个国家的另一个损失骗局，如果他们采用固定利率或中间利率制度，福利比较是针对固定利率、浮动利率和中间利率制度。我们通过纳入央行看似合理的干预活动，刻意模拟了中间利率制度。我们的理论分析得出了几个有趣的结论：(A)在福利意义上，浮动利率制度优于中间制度；(B)对于事实上的中间制度，在福利方面，法律上的中间制度可能主导浮动制度；(C)对于法律上和事实上的中间制度和固定制度，中间制度占主导地位；(D)对于法律上和事实上的浮动制度和固定制度，浮动制度占主导地位，(E)对于法律上的浮动制度，事实上的浮动主导了事实上的中间制度，(F)对于事实上和法理上固定的制度，以及法律上浮动但事实上的中间制度，后者在福利意义上占主导地位。还得到了一些其他有趣的结果。较少

This research theoretically analyzes which exchange rate regime is optimal as an exchange rate regime after the exchange rate crises in 1990's from the welfare standpoint of a small open economy. The fact that crises erupted from countries that adopted an intermediate exchange rate regime between a floating rate regime and a fixed rate regime, it has been argued that the bi-polar system would prevail among those countries. We constructed our theoretical model to compare the differences in welfare levels, keeping the difficulty in mind of selecting the optimal exchange rate regime,. because many of the crisis-hit countries have been-subject to the so-called Fear of Floating as well as Fear of Pegging . The model clearly distinguishes a de jure regime and a de facto regime. We made welfare comparisons of those regimes together with the combinations of them.In order to consider and compare a floating regime with other regimes, we inevitably construct a 3-county model. For our Welfare anal … More ysis, the loss function assumed for a small country is similar to that of the large country. In the model the central bank or the government is assumed to minimize the losses arising from unemployment and inflation. The balance of payments disequilibrium is another scam of losses for a country if they adopt a fixed or an intermediate rate regime The welfare comparison is made for a fixed rate, a floating rate, and an intermediate rate regime. We deliberately modeled an intermediate rate regime by incorporating plausible intervention activities by the central bankSeveral interesting conclusions emerge from our theoretical analysis : (a) a floating rate regime is superior to an intermediate regime in a welfare sense, (b) for a de facto intermediate regime, a de jure intermediate regime may dominate a floating regime in welfare, (c) for a de jure and de facto intermediate and a fixed regime, an intermediate regime dominates, (d) for a de jure and de facto floating and a fixed regime, a floating regime dominates, (e) for a de jure floating regime, a de facto floating dominates a de facto intermediate regime, (f) for a de facto and de jure fixed regime, and a de jure floating but de facto intermediate regime, the latter dominates in a welfare sense. Some other interesting results are also derived. Less