Research on the local environmental tax approached by the accountability theory

本研究的目的是运用可问责模型的方法，来说明地方税收竞争下地方环境税的效率。本研究认为，日本地方公共实体竞争提供的行政服务，并使用环境税作为其政策工具之一。当中央政府和地方政府之间存在信息差异，中央政府不能正确捕捉区域居民的偏好时，地方政府在分权环境下使用地方环境税达到了预期的结果。从公共资金边际成本的角度来看，慈善政府的地方环境税竞争似乎是有效的。

The purpose of this research is to show the efficiency of the local environmental tax under the local tax competition, using the method of accountability model. This research considered that the Japanese local public entities compete of the administrative services offer and use the environmental tax as one of their policy tools. When there is an information difference between the central government and a local government and the central government can not capture the regional resident's preference correctly, it reaches to the desired outcome that the local government uses the local environmental tax under the decentralized circumstances. The local environmental tax competition by the benevolent government seems to be effective in the view point of the marginal cost of public fund.