Takeover measures and ownership structure of target firms

第一个也是主要的研究表明，目标公司的潜在收购者积累的立足点的大小取决于公司的内部股权集中度、并购创造的协同价值与收购防御破坏的价值的比率，以及披露规则中规定的立足点的规模门槛。研究结果进一步揭示了在均衡状态下，收购方对收购方立足点大小和目标公司控制权分配的决策。研究二分析了市场风险影响银行投资决策的机制。考虑到一家通过回购市场融资的银行，研究表明，银行的信用风险随着市场风险的增加而增加。这项研究还表明，如果抵押品资产市场的未来流动性预计会因银行的破产而减少，银行在投资项目过程中终止投资的机制。

The first and main research shows that the size of a toehold which is accumulated by a potential acquirer of a target firm depends on the inside ownership concentration of the firm, a ratio of the value of synergy created by the merger to the destroyed value by the takeover defense, and the threshold of the size of a toehold which is specified under a disclosure rule. The results shed additional lights on the decisions of the acquirer on the size of a toehold and the allocation of control right of the target firm in equilibrium.The second research analyzes the mechanism of which the market risk affects the investment decisions of a bank. Considering a bank which finances itself through a repo market, the research shows that the credit risk of the bank increases with the market risk. This research also shows the mechanism in which the bank terminates its investment in the midst of the investing project if the future liquidity in the market of the collateral asset is anticipated to be reduced by the bankruptcy of the bank.