New Perspectives on the Algerian War 1954 - 1962

1954年至1962年的阿尔及利亚战争是非殖民化进程中最暴力和旷日持久的事件之一。这在很大程度上是因为法国殖民主义的深度和持续时间，这在阿拉伯世界是独一无二的。1954年，阿尔及利亚被并入法国，成为法国不可分割的一部分，100万定居者与900万穆斯林不安地共存。这种特殊性解释了为什么对该领域的研究兴趣激增，如果没有布兰奇关于酷刑的观点、Thénault关于正义的观点、Harbi和Meynier关于民族解放阵线的观点以及Stora关于记忆的观点，这个项目就不可能实现。然而，我的研究增进了我们的理解，因为它将1956年1月至1957年5月执政的社会党领导的共和阵线置于冲突的中心。它详细分析了为什么共和国阵线决定通过倾注财政和军事资源来改革阿尔及利亚并击败民族解放阵线，从而大幅加剧战争。对阿尔及利亚的这一承诺是出于对大国地位的焦虑。战胜民族解放阵线被认为是未来在世界舞台上站稳脚跟的关键。面对来自阿拉伯民族主义、苏联共产主义和竞争对手盎格鲁-撒克逊帝国主义的威胁，这不仅将确保石油和天然气资源的安全，还将延长法国的普遍文明使命。改革后的阿尔及利亚将是一个从巴黎到布拉柴维尔的人文主义帝国的支点：一条国际第三条道路，与对社会主义以色列的支持和对欧洲统一的信念相吻合。它还受到这样一种观念的推动，即有可能在定居者极端主义和民族解放阵线民族主义之间找到一条中间道路。因此，穆斯林解放是关于个人平等和教育机会的扩大。它是关于为普通民众，尤其是妇女提供医疗保健。它是关于将强大的共和党政府带到偏远地区，以结束歧视和贫困。同样值得注意的是，共和阵线在宗教宽容方面处理阿尔及利亚问题。法国的作用是创建一个兄弟般的、多元化的社会，将基督教、伊斯兰教和犹太教这三个信仰团体聚集在第四共和国的进步保护伞下。这种相互尊重的愿景随后与民族解放阵线的破坏性恐怖主义形成了鲜明对比。令人惊讶的是，对这种福利殖民主义的详细分析很少。和解与改革的措辞被低估了，而阿尔及利亚事务部长马塞尔·钱佩克斯等关键人物也被忽视了。因此，通过将共和阵线的政治和军事选择重新定位于阿尔及利亚战争正在展开的动态的核心，这项研究将提供新的素材和对正统观点的修正。特别是，它将表明，民族解放阵线的战略首先是针对人道主义殖民主义的。通过暴力，民族解放阵线开始两极分化态度。它的目的是摧毁任何可能构成民族独立替代方案的第三条道路。在这种情况下，认为阿尔及利亚战争是殖民者还是殖民者过于简单化了。相反，这场冲突必须被视为一种复杂的动态，吸引了一系列参与者，其中包括法国政府，这一点至关重要。因此，1956年，共和阵线承诺投入大量资源，将阿尔及利亚并入法国。相比之下，到1962年，面对民族解放阵线旷日持久的暴力，戴高乐支持独立，因为这种融合成本太高，阻碍了他更广泛的民族复兴计划。这本专著分为三个部分，题为《起源、战争和后果》，将引导读者找到关键问题。正如支持的案例所表明的那样，这本书的连贯性可以在一个清晰的时间框架中找到，该框架分析了殖民主义、阿尔及利亚民族主义、共和国阵线和战争对平民人口的影响。

The Algerian War 1954 to 1962 was one of the most violent and protracted episodes on the decolonisation process. In large part this is explained by the depth and duration of French colonialism, unique in the Arab world, whereby Algeria was annexed as an integral part of France with one million settlers co-existing uneasily with nine million Muslims by 1954. This specificity explains the surge of research interest in the area and without the perspectives of Branche on torture, Thénault on justice, Harbi and Meynier on the National Liberation Front (FLN) and Stora on memory this project would not be possible. However, my study advances our understanding because it puts the Socialist-led Republican Front, in power between January 1956 and May 1957, at the centre of the conflict. It analyses in detail why the Republican Front decided to dramatically intensify the war by pouring financial and military resources into reforming Algeria and defeating the FLN. This commitment to Algeria was motivated by anxieties about great power status. Victory over the FLN was seen to be vital for future standing on the world stage. It would not only secure oil and gas resources, but also renew France's universal civilising mission in the face of perceived threats from Arab nationalism, Soviet communism and rival Anglo-Saxon imperialisms. A reformed Algeria would be the pivot in a humanist empire from Paris to Brazzaville: an international third way that dovetailed with support for socialist Israel and a belief in European unity. It was also powered by the notion that it was possible to find a middle way between settler extremism and FLN nationalism. So, Muslim emancipation was about the expansion of individual equality and educational opportunities. It was about providing health care for the ordinary population, above all women. It was about bringing robust republican government to the remote regions that would end discrimination and poverty. Significantly too, the Republican Front approached the Algerian problem in terms of religious tolerance. France's role was to create a fraternal, pluralistic society that brought together the three faith communities - Christianity, Islam and Judaism - under the Fourth Republic's progressive umbrella. This vision of mutual respect was then contrasted with the FLN's destructive terrorism. Surprisingly there has been little detailed analysis of this welfare colonialism. The language of reconciliation and reform has been underestimated, whilst key figures, like Marcel Champeix, the Minister of Algerian Affairs, have been ignored. Thus, by relocating the Republican Front's political and military choices at the core of the unfolding dynamic of the Algerian War, this study will offer new source material and a revision of orthodox views. In particular it will show that the FLN's strategy was directed first and foremost against humanist colonialism. Through violence the FLN set out to polarise attitudes. It aimed to destroy any possible third way that posed an alternative to national independence. In this way it is too simplistic to think of the Algerian War as coloniser versus colonised. Rather the conflict must be thought of as a complex dynamic that drew in a range of actors including, crucially, the French state. So, in 1956 the Republican Front committed huge resources to integrating Algeria into France. In contrast, by 1962 de Gaulle, in the face of protracted FLN violence, supported independence because such integration was too costly and blocked his wider plans for national renewal. The monograph is divided into three parts entitled Origins, War and Consequences that will guide the reader to the key issues. As the case for support demonstrates, the book's coherence is to be found in a clear chronological framework that analyses colonialism, Algerian nationalism, the Republican Front and the impact of war on civilian populations.