Rights and the Direction of Duties

我们的项目将解释什么是欠某人的责任。直接义务是对特定的人负有的义务(例如，我对邻居的义务，履行我对她的承诺)，而非直接的义务不是对任何特定的人负有的义务(例如，我的仁慈的义务)。这一区别意味着什么？这些不同类型的职责是否需要它们的持有者采取不同的行为形式？是什么决定了一项直接的责任应该归于谁？回答这些问题将有助于揭示当代道德、政治和法律辩论的核心问题：权利的根本性质。权利是现代政治、伦理和法律中的核心概念之一，但两大理论传统在具体是什么问题上陷入僵局：“遗嘱理论”认为权利的独特功能是让权利人控制另一个人的义务，而“利益理论”则认为权利的独特功能是通过义务保护利益。这些理论之间的差异体现在对一系列案件的不同判断上，包括许诺权利、不可放弃的权利和无能力免除义务的生物的权利，如婴儿和动物。举个例子，假设我向你保证我会照顾你的母亲。利益理论似乎允许，在这种情况下，你和你母亲都有权利让我照顾她，因为我的关心将服务于你们双方的利益。相比之下，遗嘱理论指责利益理论歧视不足；它否认在这种情况下你母亲有权得到我的照顾，因为只有你作为承诺的接受者，才能免除我的责任。在这种情况下，谁有权的关键问题仍然存在争议。我们认为，哪种做法是正确的，至少在一定程度上取决于职责的方向。你母亲是否有权利因为我的承诺而照顾她，取决于我照顾她的责任是谁的：这是对你的责任，还是对你母亲的责任？同样，婴儿和动物能否享有权利，在一定程度上取决于他们是否有义务承担责任。我们认为，对直接义务的说明是解决这些案件和其他案件中关于权利性质的长期争议的必要前提。此外，我们对直接义务的说明将澄清一系列相关主张，这些主张试图限制什么是真正的权利：声称唯一真正的权利是不干涉权利(例如诺齐克、洛马斯基)，权利必须与康德意义上的“完美”义务相关(例如奥尼尔)，权利必须伴随着非最大化的“约束”的义务(例如，内格尔辩称，我不谋杀你的责任意味着我不应该谋杀你，即使是为了防止更多的谋杀)。我们将通过研究在什么情况下援助义务可以是直接义务，直接义务如何与“完美”义务相关，以及所有直接义务是否都是“约束”来评估这些主张。这些问题对公共政策(例如，我们的项目将阐明各州是否有义务帮助他们的公民，源于公民的权利，以及动物和婴儿是否可以合法地被赋予合法权利)和个人道德(例如，我们的项目将阐明我帮助家庭的职责是否是非最大化的“约束”，或者当这将产生更好的整体结果时，我是否应该愿意违反家庭关系)。我们致力于调查这些实际影响并传播我们的发现。这项为期两年的项目将以四篇期刊论文、一本期刊的编辑特刊、研讨会和讨论会议的形式产生大量研究成果，并发展一个研究人员网络，以推进这些重要问题的工作并将我们的成果传播给学术界和实践者。

Our project will explain what it means to owe someone a duty. Directed duties are owed to specific people (e.g. my duty to my neighbour, to do what I promised her) while undirected duties are not owed to any particular person (e.g. my duty to be benevolent). What does this distinction signify? Do these different types of duty require different forms of behaviour from their bearers? And what determines to whom a directed duty is owed? Answering these questions will throw light on an issue at the heart of contemporary moral, political and legal debates: the fundamental nature of rights.Rights are among the central concepts in modern politics, ethics and law, but the two main theoretical traditions have reached a stalemate over what exactly they are: the 'will theory' maintains that rights' distinctive function is to provide right-holders with control over another person's duties, while the 'interest theory' maintains that rights' distinctive function is to protect interests through duties. The difference between these theories shows up in differing judgements about a range of cases including promissory rights, unwaivable rights and the rights of beings incapable of waiving duties, such as babies and animals. To take one example, suppose I promise you that I will care for your mother. The interest theory seemingly allows that both you and your mother can have a right that I care for her in this context, because my caring will serve both your interests. By contrast, the will theory charges the interest theory with being insufficiently discriminating; it denies that your mother can have a right that I care for her in this case because only you, as recipient of the promise, can waive my duty. The vital issue of who has a right in this case remains contested. In our view, which approach is correct depends, at least in part, on the direction of duties. Whether your mother has a right that I care for her because of my promise depends on to whom my duty to care for her is owed: is it owed to you, or to your mother too? Similarly, whether babies and animals can hold rights depends partly on whether they can be owed duties. An account of directed duties is, we believe, a necessary precondition for resolving the long-running disputes over the nature of rights in these and further cases.In addition, our account of directed duties will clarify a range of related claims that seek to restrict what can qualify as genuine rights: claims that the only genuine rights are non-interference rights (e.g. Nozick, Lomasky), that rights must correlate with 'perfect' duties in Kant's sense (e.g. O'Neill), and that rights must entail duties that are non-maximising 'constraints' (e.g. Nagel argues that my duty not to murder you entails that I should not murder you even to prevent a larger number of murders). We will assess these claims by examining under what circumstances assistance duties can be directed duties, how directed duties relate to 'perfect' duties, and whether all directed duties are 'constraints'.These issues carry potentially wide-reaching implications for both public policy (e.g. our project will illuminate whether states owe their citizens duties to assist them, derived from citizens' rights, and whether animals and babies can legitimately be ascribed legal rights) and personal morality (e.g. our project will illuminate whether my duties to assist my family are non-maximising 'constraints', or whether I should be willing to violate family ties when this would produce better results overall). We are committed to investigating these practical implications and disseminating our findings.The 2-year project will produce a substantial body of research in the form of four journal papers, an edited special edition of a journal, workshops and discussion meetings, plus the development of a network of researchers to take work on these important issues forward and to disseminate our results to academics and practitioners.