Impassioned Belief: Developing and Defending a New Form of Meta-Normative Expressivism

每当一个人思考他或她应该做什么，做什么是合理的，他或她最有理由做什么，做什么是好的，或者他或她必须做什么，这些问题都是为了解决他或她应该做什么的问题，一个人就陷入了哲学家所说的“规范性思维”这样的想法在人类生活中无处不在，确实是人性的一个基本方面，使我们与更简单的生物区别开来。一只猫可能会在某种松散或微弱的意识中考虑该做什么，但肯定不会为折磨猎物的道德而苦恼。然而，在反思中，规范性思维在哲学上是令人困惑的，因为它是熟悉和无处不在的。正是这种熟悉与哲学困惑的并置使得对规范性思想和话语本质的反思如此迷人。规范性思想和话语令人困惑，部分原因是它似乎相当两面。一方面，规范性判断被划分为真或假，在看似合理的推论中发挥作用，甚至被认为提供了一个可能的知识对象。在所有这些方面，规范性判断看起来就像普通的信念。另一方面，规范性判断可以直接指导行动，我们怀疑某人说某种行为（例如）在道德上是错误的，但对这种行为没有表现出内疚的诚意，我们倾向于认为，那些确实相信自己应该做某事但选择不做的人是非理性的。在所有这些方面，规范性判断似乎更像是欲望、情感或意图，而不是信念。大卫·休谟（David Hume）称信仰和欲望是“截然不同的存在”，鉴于这一强有力的哲学论证，道德判断的两面性在哲学上令人深感困惑。因为，如果信念只是事实的惰性表征，除了事实之外别无其他，那么就很难看出规范性判断作为信念本身如何能够激励。然而，如果规范性判断只是欲望，那么很难看出规范性判断怎么会有它明显具有的类似信念的特征。回答这些棘手问题的传统尝试倾向于强调情感而排除理性（例如，在大卫休谟的作品中以及受其方法启发的人），或者强调理性和认知而排除情感（例如，在柏拉图和康德的作品中以及受其作品启发的人）。自20世纪初以来，这场长期的争论以元伦理学中自封的“表现主义者”和“认知主义者”之间的辩论的形式出现。认知主义者试图展示信念如何更自然地发挥与欲望相关的激励作用，而表现主义者则试图用欲望来模拟类似信念的特征。毫不奇怪，这些努力看起来就像是试图在圆洞里装一个方形的钉子。正是在这里，我的项目提供了突破这一僵局的希望，这是当代元伦理学和元规范理论的核心。在我看来，道德和其他规范性句子表达了信仰和欲望，道德和其他规范性判断是由信仰和欲望构成的。这种方法有望综合感伤主义和理性主义传统的优点，而不需要付出任何代价。在发展这一理论的过程中，我将其与文献中最近的其他“混合”理论进行了对比，并论证了其优越性。我还探讨了它对诸如理性的上下文敏感性、原则在道德思想和判断中的作用以及价值观与理性之间的逻辑关系等问题的影响。我还将该理论嵌入到一个更广泛的语义框架中，以避免其他语义理论所带来的猖獗和难以置信的歧义。这为“应该”等术语的具体规范用法提供了一个新的视角。

Whenever one ponders what he or she ought to do, what would be rational to do, what he or she has most reason to do, what it would be good to do, or what he or she must do, where these questions are meant to settle the question of what he or she shall do, one is engaged in what philosophers call 'normative thought.' Such thoughts are ubiquitous in human life, and indeed are a fundamental aspect of human nature which distinguishes us from simpler creatures. A cat may in some loose or weak sense deliberate about what to do, but certainly is not capable of agonizing about the morality of tormenting its prey. On reflection normative thought is, though, as philosophically puzzling as it is familiar and ubiquitous. It is this juxtaposition of the familiar with the philosophically puzzling that makes reflection on the nature of normative thought and discourse so fascinating.Normative thought and discourse is puzzling in part because it seems rather Janus-faced. On the one hand, normative judgment is classified as true or false, figures in seemingly rational inferences, and is even thought to provide a possible object of knowledge. In all of these ways, normative judgments seem like ordinary beliefs. On the other hand, normative judgment can directly guide action, we doubt the sincerity of someone who says some form of behaviour is (e.g.) morally wrong but shows no compunction about engaging in that behaviour, and we tend to think that someone who really does believe they ought to do something but choose not to do it is irrational. In all of these ways, normative judgment seems more like desire, sentiment or intention rather than belief. Given powerful philosophical arguments that beliefs and desires are what David Hume famously called 'distinct existences', this Janus-faced aspect of moral judgment is deeply philosophically puzzling. For if beliefs are just inert representations of the facts, and nothing but the facts, then it is hard to see how normative judgment qua belief could be motivating in and of itself. If, however, normative judgments are just desires then it is hard to see how normative judgment could have the belief-like features which it manifestly does have.Traditional attempts to answer these thorny questions tend to emphasize sentiment to the exclusion of reason (e.g., in the work of David Hume and those inspired by his approach) or reason and cognition to the exclusion of sentiment (e.g. in the work of Plato and Kant and those inspired by their work). Since the dawn of the 20th century this long-standing debate has taken the form of a debate between self-styled 'expressivists' and 'cognitivists' in metaethics. Cognitivists try to show how beliefs can play the motivational role more naturally associated with desire, while expressivists try to model belief-like features with desires. Not surprisingly, these efforts can seem like attempts to fit a square peg in a round hole. It is here that my project offers the promise of breaking through this impasse at the heart of contemporary metaethics and meta-normative theory more generally. On my account, moral and other normative sentences express both beliefs and desires, and moral and other normative judgments are constituted by both beliefs and desires. This approach promises to synthesize the best of both the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions without the costs of either.In developing this theroy, I contrast it with other recent 'hybrid' theories in the literature and argue for its superiority. I also explore its implications for such issues as the context-sensitivity of reasons, the role of principles in moral thought and judgment, and the logical relationships between values and reasons. I also embed the theory in a broader semantic framework which avoids the rampant and implausible ambiguities posited by other semantic theories. Thisprovides a novel perspective on how specifically normative uses of terms like 'ought' are located.