Security by Design for Interconnected Critical Infrastructures

拟议的合作工作的目标是推进安全互联公共基础设施设计的最新技术。重点是基于设计的安全性。虽然设计安全并不是一个新概念，但本文提出的方法及其背景是，特别是在相互连接的公共基础设施的背景下。关键基础设施组件的日益商品化导致嵌入式计算机在此类系统中的广泛使用。这些计算机通常通过无线通信或以太网相互连接。对远程维护能力和系统定期升级的需求加速了这一趋势。一个不受欢迎的后果是，关键的基础设施变得相互联系和相互依赖。对一个基础设施的攻击很可能会对其他基础设施产生连锁反应。了解这种相互依赖关系并开发新的设计方法以避免级联安全故障的可能性是本建议的核心。该目标将通过以下关键步骤实现：(a)基于安全分析的系统设计抽象的建模，(b)使用该模型跨互联基础设施的影响和响应分析，以及(c)升级初始设计以提高系统对网络攻击的弹性。上述方法的一个重要成果将是实现上述步骤的软件原型，并将这些工具与现有设计工具的最先进状态集成。该方法和开发的工具将通过帝国理工大学和sutd的研究团队联合设计的实验来评估其有效性和实用性。实验将在SUTD最先进的电力和水测试台上进行。与目前存在的特定模型相比，广义攻击模型将用于创建客观设计的网络攻击，以评估一个或多个系统受到攻击时互联系统的恢复能力。

The objective of the proposed collaborative work is to advance the state of the art in the design of secureinterconnected public infrastructures. The focus is on Security-by-Design. While security-by-design is not a newconcept, the approach proposed here and its context, are and especially so in the context of interconnectedpublic infrastructure.The increasing commoditisation of components for critical infrastructures has led to the widespread use of embedded computers in such systems. These computers are often interconnected using wireless communications or ethernet. This trend has been accelerated by the need for remote maintenance capability and regular upgrades of systems. An undesirable consequence has been that critical infrastructures have become interconnected and interdependent. The result of an attack on one infrastructure may well havecascading effects on others. Understanding such interdependencies and developing new design methodologies to avoid the possibility of cascading security failures is central to this proposal.The objective will be met through the following key steps: (a) modeling based on abstraction from system designfor security analysis, (b) impact and response analysis across interconnected infrastructures using the model, and(c) upgrading of the initial design to improve system resilience to cyber attacks. A significant outcome of the aboveapproach will be a software prototype that implements the steps mentioned above and the integration of such toolswith state of the art existing design tools. The methodology and the tools developed will be assessed for theireffectiveness and practical utility through experiments designed jointly by the research teams from Imperial andSUTD. The experiments will be conducted on state of the art testbeds available at SUTD for power and water.Generalized attack models, in contrast to specific models that exist today, will be used to create objectively designedcyber attacks to assess the resilience of interconnected systems when one or multiple systems are under attack.