African Digital Rights Network

自本世纪初以来，非洲经历了移动和互联网技术使用的快速扩张，这些技术以改善社会和经济发展的形式为一些国家带来了数字红利（Buskens and Webb 2014; World Bank 2016; WSIS 2018）。然而，研究也清楚地表明，数字技术的使用正在国家之间和国家内部制造新的排斥和数字鸿沟，反映和加强种族主义，放大和自动化现有的不平等（Eubanks 2017, Noble 2018; Hernandez and Roberts 2018）。在同一时间段内，许多非洲国家经历了开放和包容性治理的“公民空间关闭”（CIVICUS 2019）。用于关闭公民空间的机制包括撤销非政府组织的注册、切断资金的法规、暴力和骚扰、任意逮捕和民间社会行动者的失踪（Dupuy et al . 2016; Hossain et al . 2018）。在关闭公民空间期间，被迫转入地下或流亡的活动人士往往通过开放在线公民空间进行反击，在那里他们可以行使和捍卫言论和集会自由的权利（Buyse 2018; Roberts 2019）。通过创建这些新的虚拟公民空间，精通技术的青年运动已经能够减轻压制性政府完全关闭公民空间的努力。在线公民空间的开放以标签运动、病毒式模因和公民技术作为数字权利倡导机制为特征（Nyabola 2018; Solomon 2018）。在线公民空间对于边缘化群体表达意见、形成新的反叙事和提供政策选择尤其有价值（Tufekci 2017; Gurumurthy et al . 2017）。然而，近年来，专制政府已经开始使用自己的数字方法来关闭在线公民空间。关闭网络公民空间的机制包括关闭互联网、在线监控和数字虚假信息。政府雇佣了像剑桥分析这样的私营公司，通过“假新闻”、DDOS拒绝服务攻击，以及通过巨怪农场、半机械人网络、机器人军队和其他“协调的不真实行为”进行计算宣传，对选民进行心理分析和微观定位（Bradshaw and Howard 2017; Woolley and Howard 2017; Bradshaw and Howard 2017; 2019）。拟建的非洲数字权利网络成员为非洲公民社会在封闭公民空间背景下使用数字技术的文献做出了重要贡献（Gagliardone 2014; Ojebode 2018; Nyabola 2018; Bosch 2019; Karekwaivanane 2019; Oosterom 2019; Roberts 2019）。然而，迄今为止，关于非洲政府和私营公司越来越多地使用数字技术来关闭公民空间的研究文献很少。现有的研究主要是单个国家的研究。大多数研究评估的是单一参与者使用的单一技术。目前还没有任何比较非洲的文献来确定趋势，建立理论，指导政策和实践。目前还没有对特定的技术启示（Gibson 1977; Norman 1988）进行任何分析，这些启示使特定的技术或多或少适合于城市空间开放和关闭的不同时刻。解决这些研究差距是一项不可避免的跨学科努力。非洲数字权利网络将汇集一个由数据科学家、政治经济学家、数字民族志学家、政治传播和发展研究学者组成的独特团队。网络成员将分享经验，确定差距和优先事项，并确定一个长期的比较研究项目，以推动知识和理解的边界。首要的研究问题是“在公民空间封闭的背景下，如何利用数字技术开放公民空间，使公民能够行使他们的（数字）权利？”

Since the beginning of the century Africa has experienced a rapid expansion in the use of mobile and internet technologies, which have produced digital dividends for some in the form of improved social and economic development (Buskens and Webb 2014; World Bank 2016; WSIS 2018). However, research also clearly shows that the use of digital technologies is creating new exclusions and digital divides both between and within countries that reflect and reinforce racism, and amplify and automate existing inequalities (Eubanks 2017, Noble 2018; Hernandez and Roberts 2018). Over the same timeframe, many African countries have experienced a 'closing of civic space' for open and inclusive governance (CIVICUS 2019). Mechanisms used to close civic space have included deregistering NGOs, regulations to cut off funding, violence and harassment, arbitrary arrest and disappearance of civil society actors (Dupuy et al 2016; Hossain et al 2018). During periods of closing civic space, activists forced underground or into exile have often fought back in part by opening online civic space from where their right to freedom of speech and assembly can be exercised and defended (Buyse 2018; Roberts 2019). By creating these new virtual civic spaces, tech-savvy youth movements have been able to mitigate the efforts of repressive governments to completely close civic space.The opening of civic space online has been characterised by hashtag campaigns, viral memes, and civic technologies as mechanisms for digital rights advocacy (Nyabola 2018; Solomon 2018). Online civic space has been particularly valuable for marginalised groups to voice opinion, form new counter-narratives, and offer policy alternatives (Tufekci 2017; Gurumurthy et al 2017). However, in recent years repressive governments have begun deploying their own digital methods to close online civic space. Mechanisms to close online civic space have included internet shutdowns, online surveillance and digital disinformation. Governments have hired private companies like Cambridge Analytica to deploy psychological profiling and micro-targeting of voters with 'fake news', DDOS denial of service attacks, and computational propaganda via troll farms, cyborg networks, bot armies, and other 'coordinated inauthentic behaviour' (Bradshaw and Howard 2017; Woolley and Howard 2017; Bradshaw and Howard 2017; 2019).Members of the proposed African Digital Rights Network have made important contributions to a modest but growing literature on the use of digital technologies by African civil society in the context of closing civic space (Gagliardone 2014; Ojebode 2018; Nyabola 2018; Bosch 2019; Karekwaivanane 2019; Oosterom 2019; Roberts 2019). To date however, there is minimal research literature on the growing use of digital technologies by African governments and private companies to close civic space. The research that does exist is primarily single country studies. Most studies assess a single technology used by a single actor. There is not yet any comparative African literature to identify trends, build theory, and guide policy and practice. There has not yet been any analysis of the particular technical affordances (Gibson 1977; Norman 1988) that make specific technologies more or less appropriate at different moments of opening and closing of civic space. Addressing these research gaps is an inescapably interdisciplinary endeavour. The African Digital Rights Network will bring together a unique team of data scientists, political economists, digital ethnographers, political communications and development studies scholars. Network members will share experience, identify gaps and priorities, and define a long-term comparative research programme to push the boundaries of knowledge and understanding. The overarching research question is 'in contexts of closing civic space, how can digital technologies be used to open civic space and enable citizens to exercise their (digital) rights?'