Security in Scotland, with or without constitutional change

这六个为期一天的研讨会将汇集政策制定者、政治家、从业者和学者，探讨苏格兰和英国其他地区的宪法改革对安全治理的影响。我们的出发点是，虽然关于苏格兰独立对外交和国防“保留事项”的影响的重要工作正在进行中（Chalmers，外交事务委员会），但安全是一个日益扩大的多层次治理问题。英国2010年国家安全战略（NSS）证明了这一点，其中列出了以下非传统“优先风险”（按不同级别或“等级”）：恐怖主义、网络攻击、重大事故和自然灾害、流行病、有组织犯罪、通信中断、非法移民以及能源和贸易中断。这意味着许多政府部门和机构现在都参与了安全治理（CONTEST战略列出了29个），包括苏格兰的下放管理部门。例如，民事应急计划现在是英国地方政府的一项职能。欧盟在内部和外部安全治理中也发挥着复杂和不断扩大的作用（Bigo等）。与这种不安全感的扩散相对应，威斯敏斯特的安全监督安排现在扩展到至少六个不同的议会委员会，有时更多。这引发了人们对苏格兰安全监督安排是否足够的质疑，无论是否修改宪法。本系列研讨会将探讨苏格兰独立和宪法变革对苏格兰和英国安全治理的影响。它将汇集来自情报和安全社区、具有安全能力的英国政府部门、提供安全监督的议会委员会、欧盟机构、苏格兰民事和议会服务、苏格兰政府、政党、地方政府和其他机构（如即将成立的苏格兰单一综合警察服务）的研究和知识交流发言人。由学术安全和宪法专家组成的团队将为研讨会提供便利，并提供独立的知识投入和综合，并邀请来自英国和比较欧洲国家的演讲者补充。这些研讨会将跨越公投日期，提供独立的研究证据，为投票前的政策制定和公众辩论以及对结果的反应提供信息。苏格兰面临的威胁环境和英国一样吗？独立后的苏格兰会寻求什么样的安全治理安排？它会创建自己的安全机构来模仿英国的安全机构吗？资源和能力的影响是什么？考虑到安全治理的多层次性质，苏格兰安全机构究竟能有多独立？或者，在苏格兰和英国之间共享安全能力的可行性如何？这对民主监督、隐私和人权意味着什么？苏格兰议会想要和需要什么样的监督能力？我们可以从威斯敏斯特和类似国家的安全治理经验中学到什么？在2014年秋季公投之前和之后将分别举办四场研讨会，内容包括：1)评估当前安排下英国和苏格兰的安全治理；2)英国国家安全战略背景下英国和苏格兰的威胁环境；3)英国、苏格兰及其邻国的外交政策和安全治理的比较方面；4)英国和苏格兰当前和未来的问责制和监督安排；5)公投结果对安全治理的影响：独立还是相互依存？6)关于理解安全治理的系列研讨会的经验教训。

These six one-day seminars will bring together policymakers, politicians, practitioners and academics to explore the implications of constitutional change for security governance in Scotland and the rest of the UK (RUK). Our point of departure is that while important work is underway on the implications of Scottish independence for the 'reserved matters' of foreign affairs and defence (Chalmers, Foreign Affairs Committee), security is an increasingly expansive multi-level governance issue. This is evidenced by the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the UK which lists the following non-traditional 'priority risks' (at different levels or 'tiers'): terrorism, cyber attacks, major accidents and natural hazards, pandemics, organised crime, disruption to communications, illegal immigration, and energy and trade disruption. This means that many government departments and agencies are now involved in security governance (the CONTEST strategy lists 29), including those in the devolved administration of Scotland. For example, civil contingency planning is now a function of devolved and local government across the UK. The EU also plays a complex and expanding role in internal and external security governance (Bigo, et al.). Corresponding to this proliferation of insecurities, security oversight arrangements in Westminster now extend to at least six different parliamentary committees, occasionally more. This raises questions about the adequacy of security oversight arrangements in Scotland, with or without constitutional change.This seminar series will explore the implications of Scottish independence and constitutional change for security governance in Scotland and the UK. It will bring together speakers for research and knowledge exchange from the intelligence and security community, UK Government departments with security competences, parliamentary committees providing security oversight, EU institutions, Scottish Civil and Parliamentary Services, Scottish Government, political parties, local government and other bodies such as the forthcoming single integrated Police Service of Scotland. A team of academic security and constitutional experts will facilitate the seminars and provide independent intellectual input and synthesis, supplemented by invited speakers from the UK and comparative European countries. The seminars will span the referendum date, producing independent research evidence to inform policymaking and public debate in advance of the vote and in response to the outcome. Is the threat environment the same for Scotland as the RUK? What security governance arrangements would an independent Scotland seek to make? Would it create its own security agencies to mirror those of the RUK? What would be the resource and capacity implications? How independent could Scottish security agencies really be, given the multi-level nature of security governance? Alternatively, what is the feasibility of sharing security competences between Scotland and the RUK? What would be the implications for democratic oversight, privacy, and human rights? What oversight capacity would the Scottish parliament want and need? What can we learn from the experience of security governance in Westminster and comparable countries? Four seminars will fall before the autumn 2014 referendum and two after, covering: 1) Assessing the governance of security in the UK and Scotland under current arrangements; 2) The threat environment of the UK and Scotland in the context of the UK National Security Strategy; 3) The foreign policy and comparative aspects of security governance for the UK, Scotland and its neighbours; 4) Current and prospective accountability and oversight arrangements in the UK and Scotland; 5) The security governance implications of the referendum outcome: independence or interdependence?; 6) Lessons from the seminar series for understanding security governance.