ESRC SDAI DfE Highlight Notice: The Effects of Teacher Pay Reforms on Teacher Pay, Teacher Careers and Student Attainment (Invited Resubmission)

提供良好的教育意味着吸引和激励优秀的教师表现出色并留在这个行业。教育标准局（Ofsted）和国家审计署（NAO）强调了招聘教师和为进入教师行业的人发展有吸引力的职业道路的问题。集中的薪酬决定被认为是问题的一部分，因为它无法对工人在当地劳动力市场的外部选择做出反应（Britton和Propper 2016）。2012年，学校教师审查机构（STRB）认为：“目前的薪酬体系僵化、复杂、难以驾驭，不利于学校招募高质量的教师或领导者”（DfE 2012）。它建议在决定教师薪金方面增加灵活性，在征聘和留用教师方面增加酌处权。报告还建议将教师薪酬与卓越表现和绩效改善挂钩，对最有能力的教师给予更高的奖励和更快的晋升。改革于2013年对新教师生效，并于2014年对所有人生效（STRB, 2013），并为“维持”的学校提供了学院已经拥有的权力。目前还没有证据表明它对学校、教师或学生成绩的影响。本研究将填补这一知识空白，并将评估改革在多大程度上有助于招聘和留住教师。目前还不清楚这些改革可能会产生什么影响。首先，关于公共部门绩效薪酬（PP）的价值几乎没有证据。通过工人分类和激励效应将PP与产量增加联系起来的文献主要涉及营利性活动。对于公共部门专业人员来说，PP的分类和激励效应不太确定，因为内在动机在职业选择和员工努力中起着重要作用（Burgess和Metcalfe， 2000）。传统上，教师是通过基于工资增长和晋升的职业激励来获得奖励的（Prendergast, 1999: 10）。鉴于难以评估改变的好处，学校可能希望坚持“久经考验”的方法。另一方面，学校可能会采取行动，因为研究表明，教师相对于其他职业的薪酬是吸引高能力工人从事教学的一个重要因素（Dolton和Marcenaro-Gutierrez， 2011）。更广泛地说，没有理由怀疑效率工资不应该像在私营部门那样影响公共部门职业的工人努力和劳动力流动率。我们的研究将比较改革前后教师薪酬的校级分布，以及这是否因学校、教师和地区特征而有所不同。我们将利用改革前制度下的薪酬水平估计来捕捉与事实不符的工资，并开发统计测试，以确定改变薪酬设定行为的学校，并将其与未改变的学校进行比较。这种学校的分类将使我们能够检查薪酬改革对学校填补教师空缺的能力、新员工的入职工资、在职人员的工资增长以及学校内部和学校之间教师流动性的影响。我们将考虑薪酬改革对教师留任的影响，并调查薪酬改革是否通过对入职和离职人员的影响而改变了教师的特征。最后，我们将探讨薪酬改革如何影响在校学生的平均成绩。研究结果将引起关注教师薪酬改革实施和效果的政策制定者、对（非）集中化薪酬结构和公共部门PP感兴趣的学者以及关注教师劳动力市场的教育学家的兴趣。研究结果还可能影响学校领导在管理学校员工时背离“久经考验”的薪酬做法的倾向。

Delivering good education means attracting and incentivising good teachers to perform well and remain in the profession. Ofsted and the National Audit Office (NAO) have highlighted problems recruiting teachers and developing attractive career paths for those entering the profession. Centralised pay determination is deemed part of the problem since it is unable to respond to workers' outside options in local labour markets (Britton and Propper 2016). In 2012 the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) argued: "The current pay system is rigid, complex and difficult to navigate and does not support schools to recruit the high-quality teachers or leaders" (DfE 2012). It recommended increased flexibility in determining teacher salaries and greater discretion in teacher recruitment and retention. It also recommended linking teacher pay to excellence and performance improvement, with higher rewards and more rapid progression for the most able teachers. The reforms came into effect in 2013 for new teachers and for all in 2014 (STRB, 2013) and provided "maintained" schools with powers Academies already had. There is currently no evidence on its effects on schools, teachers or student attainment. This study will fill this gap in knowledge, and will assess to what degree the reform can help recruit and retain teachers.It is unclear what impact the reforms might have had. First, there is little evidence regarding the value of performance pay (PP) in the public sector. The literature linking PP to increased output via worker sorting and incentive effects relates mainly to for-profit activities. The sorting and incentive effects of PP are less certain for public sector professionals where intrinsic motivation plays an important part in occupational choice and worker effort (Burgess and Metcalfe, 2000). Traditionally teachers have been rewarded through career incentives based on incremental pay progression and promotion (Prendergast, 1999: 10). Schools may wish to stick to "tried and tested" approaches given difficulties appraising the benefits of changing. On the other hand, schools may act in the knowledge that research indicates that the pay of teachers relative to other professions is an important factor in attracting high ability workers to teaching (Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). More broadly, there is no reason to suspect that efficiency wages should not affect worker effort and labour turnover in public sector occupations just as they do in the private sector.Our study will compare the school-level distribution in teacher pay pre- and post-reforms, and whether this varies by school, teacher and regional characteristics. Using estimates of pay levels under the pre-reform regime to capture counterfactual wages, we will develop statistical tests to identify the schools changing their pay setting behaviour and compare them to those that did not. This classification of schools will allow us to examine the impact of the pay reforms on schools' ability to fill teacher vacancies, on the entry wages of new hires, wage progression among incumbents and teacher mobility within and across schools. We will consider the effects of the pay reforms on teacher retention and investigate whether the pay reforms changed teacher characteristics through effects on those entering and leaving the profession. Finally, we will examine how the pay reforms may have affected average student attainment at the school level.The findings will interest policy makers concerned with the implementation and effects of the teacher pay-reform, academics interested in (de)centralised pay structures and PP in the public sector and educationalists with a focus on teacher labour markets. The results may also affect school leaders' propensity to depart from "tried and tested" pay practices to manage their school's workforce.