Hate Crime After Brexit: Linking Terrestrial and New Forms of Data to Inform Governance

皇家检察署将仇恨犯罪定义为任何被认为是由基于一个人的种族、宗教、残疾、性取向或变性身份的敌意或偏见所引起的刑事犯罪，而基于仇外心理的犯罪被警察记录为种族或宗教敌意。内政部（2017年）显示，2016/17年度有80,393起仇恨犯罪记录，而前一年为62,518起，增长了29%。英格兰和威尔士的犯罪调查估计，可以说是一个更可靠的衡量仇恨犯罪受害者的方法，因为他们对警察培训/记录实践的变化不敏感，表明仇恨犯罪以及一般犯罪在2008年至2015年期间有所下降，然后转向显示种族和宗教仇恨犯罪在13/15和15/17之间从112,000起增加到117,000起（5%）。这是一个重要的转折点，因为这反映了该调查10年来仇恨犯罪的首次上升，而几乎所有其他形式的犯罪都在继续下降。虽然警方记录的犯罪增加部分归因于更多的报告，但内政部的报告明确详细说明了仇恨犯罪的真正上升，特别是在欧盟公投期间。研究还表明，在英国脱欧公投后，仇恨犯罪的性质发生了变化，针对欧洲大陆（包括非东欧）受害者的新方式(例如：仇恨犯罪的“游戏化”——“惩罚一个穆斯林日”和网络犯罪)，带来了新的后果（例如离开英格兰和威尔士，前往苏格兰和其他欧洲国家）（Burnett 2017, Chakraborti 2017, Rzepnikowska 2018）。据报道，脱欧公投后仇恨的流行程度和性质的变化明显增加，这需要制定新的治理模式。随着内政部仇恨犯罪行动计划（2016年7月）的发布，这种回应已经开始，该计划包括增加报告，保护礼拜场所以及发展我们对“仇恨驱动因素”的理解的倡议。此外，公诉署署长正计划对网络仇恨滥用者实施更严厉的惩罚，苏格兰正在对仇恨犯罪立法进行审查。这些反应清楚地表明，政府认识到仇恨犯罪的性质正在发生变化。尽管做出了这些努力，英国脱欧后仍有人呼吁政府重新审视如何处理仇恨犯罪，以改善报告、受害者服务和社区凝聚力（Chakraborti 2017）。仇恨犯罪上升的短期和长期原因、对治理这一问题的影响，以及英国脱欧后种族隔离、社区凝聚力和培育新的共同公民原则等更广泛的相关问题，仍存在重大问题。例如，孤立的数据来源无法告诉我们，仇恨犯罪的上升是由于受害者和证人报告的增加、警方更好的记录、投票和脱欧运动导致犯罪行为的实际增加，还是多种因素的综合作用。我们的基本假设是，更好地了解与英国脱欧有关的仇恨犯罪的模式和驱动因素，是改善治理的先决条件。该项目将开发创新方法，利用相关的调查、行政、新闻和社交媒体数据来解决这一问题。设计新的治理干预措施需要对所有可用数据（不仅仅是孤立的警察和调查数据）进行强有力的分析，并以一种允许按地理进行纵向分析的方式将其联系起来。只有有了这样的数据和方法创新，政策制定者才能意识到与英国脱欧相关的仇恨犯罪的最重要驱动因素。

The Crown Prosecution Service defines hate crime as any criminal offence which is perceived to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person's race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity, with crimes based on xenophobia being recorded by the police as race or religious hostility. The Home Office (2017) shows there were 80,393 hate crime offences recorded in 2016/17, compared with 62,518 the year before, a 29 per cent increase. Crime Survey for England and Wales estimates, arguably a more reliable measure of hate crime victimisation due to their insensitivity to changes in police training/recording practices, show that hate crime, along with general crime, decreased between 2008 and 2015, before turning to show an increase in race and religious hate crime from 112,000 to 117,000 crimes (5 per cent) between 13/15 and 15/17. This is a significant turning point, as it reflects the first rise in hate crime recorded by the Survey in 10 years, while almost all other forms of crime continue to fall. While the increase in police recorded crime can be partially attributed to greater reporting, the Home Office report is unequivocal in detailing a genuine rise in hate crime, particularly around the EU Referendum. Research has also shown the changing nature of hate crime post-Brexit vote, with increases in the targeting of victims from mainland Europe (including non-Eastern Europeans), in new ways (e.g. 'gamification' of hate crime - 'Punish a Muslim Day', and online offences), with new consequences (e.g. leaving England and Wales for Scotland and other European countries) (Burnett 2017, Chakraborti 2017, Rzepnikowska 2018). The reported stark increase in prevalence and change in the nature of hate post-Brexit vote requires new governance models to be formulated. This response has begun, with the publication of the Home Office Hate Crime Action Plan (July 2016) that includes initiatives to increase reporting, secure places of worship, and to develop our understanding of the 'drivers of hate'. In addition, the Director of Public Prosecutions is planning for stiffer penalties for online hate abusers, and a review is underway on hate crime legislation in Scotland. These responses are clear indicators that the government recognises the changing nature of hate crime. Despite these efforts, fresh calls for government to re-examine how it deals with hate crime have been made in relation to improving reporting, victim services and community cohesion post-Brexit (Chakraborti 2017). Significant questions remain over the short- and long-term causes of this rise in hate crime, what the implications are for the governance of this problem, and the wider linked issues of segregation, community cohesion and fostering new shared principles of citizenship post-Brexit. For example, isolated data sources cannot tell us if the rise in hate crime was due to increased reporting by victims and witnesses, better recording by police, an actual increase in perpetration because of the vote and leave campaign, or a combination of multiple factors. Our underlying assumption is that better information about the patterns and drivers of Brexit-related hate crime is a precondition for better governance. This project will develop innovative methods, using linked survey, administrative, press and social media data, to address this. The design of new governance interventions requires robust analysis of all available data (not just police and survey data in isolation), linked in a way that allow longitudinal analysis by geography. Only with such data and methodological innovations can policy-makers be made aware of the most significant driving factors of Brexit-related hate crime.