Britain and the European Community, 1 January 1973 - 5 June 1975: Policy, Party Politics and Public Opinion

英国被称为一个笨拙、不情愿甚至辱骂的欧洲人，一个位于欧洲大陆边线上的岛屿，往好了说是冷漠，往坏了说是对欧盟(EU)怀有敌意。2016年6月23日的公投中，51.9%的英国选民选择脱离欧盟，这似乎证实了这一特征。我即将出版的书探讨了英国和欧洲争议史上的一个更早的时刻：从1973年1月1日英国加入当时被称为欧洲共同体(EC)到1975年6月5日全民公投的时期。这是第一次研究英国对共同体的政策，加入欧盟后的党政和国内争端，以及公众对公投活动中的论点的反应。尽管这一早期阶段在英国-欧盟关系中很重要，但在这个问题上的学术研究非常少。文献告诉我们，希思政府满怀希望地将英国带入共同体。人们认为，加入欧盟将拯救英国经济，并为英国确定一个明确的战后角色。然而，1973年是动荡的一年，尽管人们对入盟抱有期望，但政府对入盟的结果感到失望。一年后，希思的继任者哈罗德·威尔逊寻求重新谈判英国的成员国条款，主要是为了平息内阁、政府和政党的分歧。他打破了宪法原则，暂停内阁的集体责任，以便大臣们在英国首次全民公投之前开展竞选活动。1975年6月5日，67%的英国选民对欧洲投了赞成票，投票率为65%。这一决定被描述为“明确的”但“不热心的……投票维持现状”。这一说法提出了进一步调查的重要观点。鉴于历届英国政府在争取成员资格方面都遇到了困难，加入共同体似乎不太可能是一个一帆风顺的过程，只会因为具有挑战性的环境而偏离轨道。重新谈判无疑是威尔逊用来管理他的政党的一种政治策略，但它也可以被视为自20世纪50年代以来推行的长期方法的一部分，即英国试图改变共同体，以适应其国家利益。最后，选民“毫不含糊”的说法表明，此次公投克服了此前公众舆论的波动。因此，我的书提出了两个问题。希思和威尔逊推行对欧共体政策的国内和国际因素是什么？如何解释公投的结果？核心论点是，1973年1月至1975年6月期间，英国政治精英试图将本国与欧共体的关系从一种以不确定性为特征的关系，转变为一种政治和公开合法化的框架，以便英国能够在战后世界中运作。对希思来说，这是通过兑现他的政府对英国在欧盟的未来做出的承诺来实现的。在1973年的过程中，这被证明是不可能的，因为政府的运作方式，结果是与其社区合作伙伴发生了冲突。考虑到党内的分歧，希思的做法对威尔逊并不开放。取而代之的是，他决定举行正式的重新谈判和全民公投，以结束工党的党派政治辩论，进而使成员资格合法化。竞选活动要求选民从日常问题的角度来思考共同体，比如食品价格，以及更大的问题，比如英国的主权和战后在世界上的角色。这是一次重要的国家对话，它受到1970年代危机背景的影响，以及英国关于欧洲一体化的辩论中不可或缺的长期衰落叙事。最终，选民们可能对欧洲说了‘是’，但他们不确定自己是否做出了正确的选择。

Britain has been called an awkward, reluctant and even abusive European, an island on the side-lines of the European continent which is at best apathetic, but at worst hostile to the European Union (EU). The referendum on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9% of voters in the UK opted to leave the EU, seems to confirm that characterisation. My forthcoming book explores an earlier moment in the contentious history of Britain and Europe: the period from Britain's entry to what was then called the European Community (EC) on 1 January 1973 to the referendum on 5 June 1975. It is the first study of Britain's policies towards the Community, the party-political and domestic disputes following accession, and the public reaction to the arguments made in the referendum campaigns.Despite the importance of this early period in UK-EC relations, there has been remarkably little scholarship on the subject. The literature tells us that Heath's government took Britain into the Community with high hopes. Entry to the EC, it was believed, would save the economy and define a clear postwar role for Britain. Yet 1973 was a turbulent year and despite the expectations surrounding membership, the government was disappointed with the results of accession. One year later Heath's successor, Harold Wilson, sought to renegotiate Britain's terms of membership, principally to quell divisions in his Cabinet, government and party. He broke with constitutional principles to suspend the collective responsibility of Cabinet in order for ministers to campaign ahead of the UK's first-ever national referendum. On 5 June 1975, 67% of British voters said 'yes' to Europe, on a turnout of 65%. The decision was described as an 'unequivocal' but 'unenthusiastic...vote for the status quo'.This narrative raises important points for further enquiry. Given the difficulties experienced by successive British governments in securing membership, it seems unlikely that entry to the Community would have been a smooth process, only to be pushed off-course by challenging circumstances. The renegotiation was undoubtedly a political tactic used by Wilson to manage his party, but it can also be viewed as part of a long-term approach, pursued since the 1950s, whereby Britain tried to change the Community to suit its national interests. Finally, the argument that voters were 'unequivocal' suggests that the referendum overcame previous volatility in public opinion. Thus, my book asks two questions. What are the domestic and international factors that account for the policies towards the EC pursued by Heath and Wilson? And what explains the outcome of the referendum? The central argument is that between January 1973 and June 1975, Britain's political elite attempted to transform their country's relationship with the Community from one characterised by uncertainty to a politically and publicly legitimised framework in which Britain could operate in the postwar world. For Heath, this was to be accomplished by delivering on the promises his government made about Britain's future in the EC. Over the course of 1973 this proved impossible due to the ways in which the government operated and, as a result, clashed with its Community partners. Given the division in his party, Heath's approach was not open to Wilson. Instead, he decided to hold a formal renegotiation and national referendum in order to end Labour's party-political debate and, by extension, legitimise membership. The campaigns asked voters to think about the Community in terms of everyday issues, like food prices, and bigger questions, such as Britain's sovereignty and postwar role in the world. This was an important national conversation, one which was influenced by the context of crisis in the 1970s and the long-term narrative of decline that had become integral to the British debate about European integration. In the end, voters may have said 'yes' to Europe, but they were left uncertain about whether they made the right choice.