From Fome Zero to Nutrition for Growth: a comparative study of policy responses to food and nutrition security issues in Brazil and the UK

这项研究提供了一个比较分析英国和巴西的政策反应，粮食和营养安全（FNS）的问题，自2003年以来。2013年，巴西和英国签署了全球营养促进增长（N4 G）契约，这是一项自愿协议，承诺加强国际合作，通过私营公共部门伙伴关系应对FNS挑战，这对实现可持续发展目标至关重要。N4 G过程是一个有用的汇合点，分析私营部门，国际组织和民间社会（CS）如何游说巴西和英国国家精英修改他们对FNS政策的承诺。我的工作还将着眼于这些国内政策议程如何通过政策转移和翻译相互影响。我的研究涉及更广泛的问题，即如何将FNS治理议程转化为国内和全球层面的改善成果。在英国和巴西，国家和非国家行为者塑造FNS政策议程的方式有何异同？2. N4 G的认可如何反映国内/全球营养治理议程？3.这些正式/非正式的两级博弈如何影响全球FNS的结果？理论背景：FNS政策的研究提供了一个独特的机会，在国内/全球层面的政策制定不同的学科方法的桥梁。巴西在通过社会政策解决饥饿和营养不良问题方面取得了相当大的进展，为此已做了大量工作，以记录巴西在政治经济方面的进展。最近的营养管理研究强调了政治精英、CS和私营部门在塑造FNS成果方面的作用，主要是在“全球南方”。然而，在英国，这方面的研究较少，鉴于国内FNS问题的日益普遍，这是一个至关重要的差距。其次，文献试图了解PE因素塑造日益增长的全球FNS合作，和传统的捐助国，如英国与“非传统的发展伙伴”，以解决具体的政策问题之间的多利益相关者的伙伴关系的增长。这一趋势是理解不断变化的英国-巴西FNS合作的PE的关键，我将探讨国家和私营部门利益在FNS政策中勾结/冲突的方式，导致在国内/国际上推进/阻碍进展的收益/损失。从2010年开始，英国在FNS合作中的全球领导地位与其国内FNS政策反应有很大差异。2010年以来的政府福利改革产生了深远的影响，加剧了2007- 2008年危机造成的贫困和不平等。2014年，联合国的数据估计有840万人生活在粮食不安全的家庭中。正是在这个时候，英国主办了2012年饥饿和2013年N4 G峰会，突出了国家/国际政策反应之间的矛盾，在FNS政策反应中同时存在分歧和趋同点。与此同时，巴西签署N4 G标志着与国内FNS政策的分歧。在N4 G之前，巴西的社会部和执行FNS政策的CS拒绝正式参与全球多方利益攸关方营养倡议，认为它们是不负责任的私营部门利益的工具。因此，巴西的N4 G领导角色被视为工人党和CS运动之间政治契约的突破，这使他们掌权。了解这一突破将有助于了解国内FNS参与者之间的竞争/合作，揭示FNS政策空间中所代表的不同利益。最后，我想解释这些两级游戏如何通过探索政治背景以及国家/国际政治配置和政策干预之间的动态关系，帮助理解国际上的FNS结果。这项研究对1）英国-巴西FNS合作，2）将私营部门/CS行为者正式纳入决策过程和3）全球FNS政策和治理产生了影响。

This study offers a comparative analysis of the UK and Brazil's policy responses to food and nutrition security (FNS) issues since 2003. In 2013, Brazil and the UK signed the Global Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Compact, a voluntary agreement signalling commitment to strengthening international cooperation to tackle FNS challenges through private public-sector partnerships, considered vital for meeting the SDGs. The N4G process is a useful convergence point to analyse how the private sector, international organisations and civil society (CS) lobbied Brazil and UK state elites to modify their commitment to FNS policies. My work will also look at how these domestic policy agendas influenced one another through policy transfer and translation. My research speaks to the broader question of how to translate FNS governance agendas into improved outcomes at domestic and global levels.Research questions:1. What are the similarities and differences in the ways state and non-state actors shape FNS policy agendas in the UK and Brazil?2. How does the N4G endorsement reflect domestic/global nutrition governance agendas?3. How do these formal/informal two-level games shape FNS outcomes worldwide?Theoretical background: The study of FNS policies offers a unique opportunity to bridge different disciplinary approaches to policymaking at domestic/global levels. Much has been done to document the political economy (PE) of Brazil's considerable progress in tackling hunger and malnutrition through social policy. Recent nutrition governance studies highlight the role of political elites, CS and the private sector in shaping FNS outcomes, principally in the 'Global South'. However, less research exists on this in the UK, a vital gap given the rising prevalence of domestic FNS issues. Secondly, the literature has sought to understand the PE factors shaping growing global FNS cooperation, and the growth of multistakeholder partnerships between traditional donor countries like the UK working with 'non-traditional development partners' to tackle specific policy issues. This trend is key in understanding the PE of changing UK-Brazil FNS cooperation, and I will explore the ways in which state and private sector interests collude/collide in FNS policy, resulting in gains/losses in advancing/blocking progress domestically/internationally.From 2010, the UK's global leadership in FNS cooperation diverged considerably from its domestic FNS policy responses. Government welfare reforms since 2010 have had far-reaching impacts, increasing and compounding the poverty and inequality caused by the 2007-8 crisis. In 2014, UN data estimated 8.4M people lived in food insecure households. It was at this time that the UK hosted the 2012 Hunger and 2013 N4G summits, highlighting the contradiction between national/international policy responses, with simultaneous points of divergence and convergence in FNS policy responses. At the same time, Brazil's signing of N4G signalled a divergence from domestic FNS policy. Until N4G, Brazil's social ministries and CS implementing FNS policy refused to engage formally with global multistakeholder nutrition initiatives, seeing them as vehicles for unaccountable private sector interests. Brazil's N4G leadership role was thus seen as a break in the political compact between the Workers' Party and CS movements which brought them to power. Understanding this break will shed light on the competition/collaboration between domestic FNS actors, revealing the different interests represented in FNS policy spaces. Finally, I want to explain how these two-level games help understand FNS outcomes internationally by exploring the political context and the dynamic relationships between national/international political configurations and policy interventions. This research has ramifications for 1) UK-Brazil FNS cooperation, 2) the formal inclusion of private sector/CS actors in policymaking processes and 3) global FNS policy and governance.