The Political Philosophy of Digital Identity

随着2016年GOV.UK Verify的推出，英国政府声称已经开发出一种安全，灵活和具有成本效益的方式来识别和验证其公共服务的在线用户。尽管新的联合数字身份方案1的采用速度缓慢，该方案没有存储用户或其属性的集中数据库，但该计划现在将其范围扩展到公共服务使用之外（Bouchard，2017）。我提出的研究课题主要是对这种扩展的规范性批评验证到私营部门的企业和组织。通过实践和理论分析，我将调查开放验证到私营部门可能对英国公民交织的数字和物理身份的影响，以及这可能对他们的自由和参与公共领域带来的次要影响。在整个过程中，将与被中止的国民身份证计划以及许多公民已经拥有的企业数字身份进行对比和比较。最终，这个案例研究将引导我修改现有的在线身份和隐私理论，以更好地适应联合数字身份系统和私营部门政府支持的身份保证的前景。这将反过来产生未来的政策建议，重点是通过将验证视为公民有权使用的公用事业来增加用户隐私和控制。（例如，Tsakalakis等人，2016年; Stalla-Bourdillon等人，2018年），并且已经对其公共部门使用的社会影响进行了一些研究（Brandão et al，2015），对于即将到来的私营部门扩张可能产生的社会政治影响，学术界显然缺乏讨论。因此，探索这种扩展将如何影响政府身份系统先前的政治，社会和哲学考虑是至关重要和及时的，因为验证是政府数字战略（GDS）的基石。这意味着该项目将对当代和未来的英国政治具有现实适用性。更全面地了解验证的扩展对用户的数字/模拟身份、隐私、安全和自由带来的好处和风险，将为预测围绕拟议方案和其他类似方案的问题提供急需的学术基础。研究报告1.将Verify扩展到私营部门的实际影响和政治原因是什么？2.围绕这一扩张的潜在哲学和伦理问题是什么？a.数字身份是如何与物理身份分离并交织在一起的？B.传统的身份理论能在多大程度上回应联邦身份？C.与现有的企业或政府数字身份相比，验证如何？3.验证身份是否应该被视为公民有权使用的公共事业？

With the launch of GOV.UK Verify in 2016, the British Government claimed to have developed a secure, flexible and cost-effective way of identifying and authenticating onlineusers of its public services. Despite slow uptake of the novel federated digital identity scheme1, which stores no centralised database of users or their attributes, the plan is now to extend itsremit beyond public services usage alone (Bouchard, 2017). My proposed research topic is predominantly a normative critique of this expansion of Verify to private-sector businessesand organisations. Through practical and theoretical analysis, I will investigate the effects that opening Verify up to the private sector might have on the intertwined digital and physicalidentities of British citizens, and the secondary effects this might entail for their liberty and participation in the public sphere. Throughout, contrast and comparison with the abortedNational ID Card scheme - as well as the corporate digital identities that many citizens already possess - will be drawn. Ultimately, this case study will lead me to modify existing theories ofonline identity and privacy to better accommodate federated digital identity systems and the prospect of government-backed identity assurance in the private-sector. This will in turngenerate policy recommendations for the future, with emphasis placed on increasing user privacy and control by conceiving of Verify as a public utility to which citizens have a right.Whilst technical analyses of the federated identity systems underpinning Verify are plentiful (E.g. Tsakalakis et al, 2016; Stalla-Bourdillon et al, 2018), and some research has been doneinto the social effects of its public-sector usage (Brandão et al, 2015), there is a notable absence of academic discussion of the socio-political impacts that the forthcoming private-sectorexpansion could have. Exploring how such an expansion will affect previous political, social, and philosophical considerations of governmental identity systems is thus vitally important andtimely, as Verify forms the cornerstone of the Government Digital Strategy (GDS). This means the project will have real-world applicability to contemporary and future British politics. Afuller understanding of the benefits and risks that Verify's expansion presents to a user's digital/analogue identity, privacy, security and freedoms would provide a much-neededacademic basis for anticipating the issues that surround the proposed scheme and others like it.Research Questions1. What are the practical impacts of, and the political reasons for, expanding Verify to theprivate-sector?2. What are the potential philosophical and ethical issues surrounding this expansion?a. How are digital identities separate to and enmeshed with physical identities?b. How far can traditional theories of identity respond to federated identity?c. How does Verify compare to existing corporate or governmental digital identities?3. Should a Verify identity be thought of as a public utility to which citizens have a right?