What 'if'? A Modal Analysis of Indicative Conditionals

几乎所有的哲学家都使用“如果”的物质解释，这样，在除了真的前件和假的后件之外的任何实质真值组合下，指示性条件都是真的。然而，大多数人在这样做时心情沉重--许多看似错误的指示性条件句（如“如果月球表面有液态水，月球将爆炸”）在这种解释下是正确的（假设它们的先行词是错误的）。因此，指示性条件句是否暗示了先行词和后件之间的模态关系？这是我的主要研究问题，我将捍卫一个肯定的答案。为了做到这一点，我将致力于说明获得这样一种模态关系需要什么，以及它将如何支配所讨论的现象的行为。我还将与虚拟条件句进行比较，以确定其模态分析是否有助于我们理解陈述性条件句的模态。此外，我还要问，这种观点是否与我们对科学方法的理解相一致。可能的是，陈述性条件句的范式事例是经验法则的陈述;因此，一个的理论也许可以告知另一个的理论。

Almost all philosophers use the material interpretation of 'if' such that indicative conditionals are true given any combination of subsentential truth-values except a true antecedent and false consequent. Most, however, do so with a heavy heart - many indicative conditionals that are seemingly false (such as 'If there is liquid water on the moon's surface, the moon will explode') are true on this interpretation (given that their antecedents are false).Does the indicative conditional, therefore, imply a modal relationship between antecedent and consequent? This is my main research question, and I will be defending an affirmative answer. To do so, I will be aiming to give an account of what it would take for such a modal relationship to obtain, and how it would govern the behaviour of the phenomena in question. I will also draw comparisons to the subjunctive conditional to determine whether its modal analysis can help us understand the modality of indicative conditionals. Furthermore, I will ask whether this view coheres with our understanding of the scientific method. Plausibly, the paradigm case of the indicative conditional is the statement of empirical law; hence, theory of one can perhaps inform theory of the other.