Cryptanalysis of Isogeny-BasedPost-Quantum Cryptography

大规模通用量子计算机可能在未来10到30年内出现在任何地方，威胁到今天使用的公钥密码学。在建立新的后量子安全密码标准方面正在取得进展。该项目将有助于这些新方案的密码分析，最初侧重于同源方案，通过研究数学上的基本难题。结果将包括新的攻击或针对它们的安全性证明，考虑攻击的可行性和潜在的缓解措施。这些发现可以为标准化工作和协议设计提供信息。

Large-scale universal quantum computers could emerge anywhere within the next 10 to 30 years, threatening to break public-key cryptography in use today. Progress is being made to establish new post-quantum secure cryptographic standards. This project will contribute to the cryptanalysis of these new schemes, initially focusing on isogeny-based schemes, by studying the underlying hard problems mathematically. Results will feature new attacks or proofs of security against them, considering attack feasibility and potential mitigations. Discoveries made could inform standardisation efforts, and protocol design.