On the Security of Modern Satellite Communication Systems and Infrastructure

卫星系统对于各种应用已变得至关重要，而且发射和运行成本比以往任何时候都低。这在很大程度上是由于现成组件和商业发射供应商的可用性增加，以及运载火箭共享等安排。与此同时，攻击者的能力也大幅提升，特别是由于廉价的软件定义无线电（SDR）硬件的广泛使用，使得欺骗、重放和干扰攻击变得更加可行。这给传统的“旧空间”系统带来了问题，这些系统没有足够的保护来抵御配备现代无线电技术的对手的威胁。“新空间”产业格局的其他近期变化，如卫星巨型星座和多租户，也提出了一些有趣的问题，即新的攻击是否可能，或者地面协议如何适应大型空间系统的高效和安全工作。这项研究旨在更好地统一空间系统，更全面地了解旧空间系统的安全和对策，并更好地保护新空间。在这个研究项目中，我们的目标是解决两个主要的关注领域。首先，我们来看看旧空间系统的安全状态，以及最近攻击者能力的增加如何改变它。我们证明，这些系统容易受到攻击，无论是在原始信号水平和更高层的处理系统。然后，我们研究如何更有效地检测和预防这些攻击，使用高采样率无线电信号调查设备指纹。我们还评估了这一点可以与其他对策一起使用，以在新旧空间系统中提供额外的信息真实性置信度。其次，我们来看看新空间系统的最新发展。我们调查了对卫星的电磁干扰攻击，特别是在多租户卫星和拼车的背景下，其中控制车载无线电硬件的对手可能会影响他们不控制的组件。我们还研究了大型卫星星座中的密钥管理和密钥分配问题，提出了通过有效撤销来确保最终一致性和最小化受损密钥影响的系统。该项目属于EPSRC“信息和通信技术”研究领域的福尔斯。

Satellite systems have become crucial to a huge range of applications, and have become cheaper than ever before to launch and operate. This is largely due to a greater availability of off-the-shelf components and commercial launch providers, as well as arrangements like launch vehicle ridesharing. At the same time, attacker capabilities have dramatically increased, particularly due to the widespread availability of cheap Software-Defined Radio (SDR) hardware, making spoofing, replay, and jamming attacks far more feasible. This presents problems for legacy "Old Space" systems, which do not have sufficient protections against the threat of adversaries equipped with modern radio technology. Other recent shifts in the landscape of the "New Space" industry such as satellite megaconstellations and multi-tenancy also raise interesting questions about whether novel attacks are possible, or how terrestrial protocols might need adapting to work efficiently and securely in large space systems. This research aims to better unify space systems, providing a more complete understanding of security and countermeasures in Old Space systems and better securing New Space. In this research project we aim to tackle two primary areas of concern. Firstly, we look at the state of security in Old Space systems, and how it has been changed by the recent increase in attacker capabilities. We demonstrate that these systems are vulnerable to attacks, both at the raw signal level and within the higher layer processing systems. We then look at how these attacks can be more effectively detected and prevented, investigating device fingerprinting using high sample rate radio signals. We also assess how well this could be used alongside other countermeasures to provide an additional level of confidence in message authenticity in both Old and New Space systems. Secondly, we look at recent developments in New Space systems. We investigate electromagnetic interference attacks on satellites, particularly in the context of multi-tenant satellites and ridesharing, in which an adversary controlling on-board radio hardware could affect components they do not control. We also examine the problems involved with key management and key distribution in large satellite constellations, proposing systems to ensure eventual consistency and minimise the effect of compromised keys through efficient revocation.This project falls within the EPSRC "Information and Communication Technologies" research area.