Changing the Face of Corruption: Audits, Substitution Between Forms of Corruption, and Public Sector Performance

有几个国家的政府试图通过审计来遏制腐败。然而，审计不可避免地会比其他形式更好地揭示某些形式的腐败，腐败官员可以适应。因此，审计是否会系统性地增加它们没有揭示的腐败形式的发生率？如果是这样的话，这种增长会带来永久性的福利后果吗？本研究项目对这些问题进行了实证研究。为了做到这一点，它利用了巴西的一个反腐败项目，该项目在2003年至2015年期间随机选择了数千个地方政府接受审计。虽然这个项目成功地发现了一些形式的腐败，但它没有发现裙带关系的做法。为了衡量这种替代形式的腐败在一段时间内的系统性发生率，该项目使用了巴西在没有经过竞争性公务员考试的情况下聘用的市长和公共部门雇员的全名信息，使用姓氏来识别家庭关系。然后，该项目测试在经过审计的市政当局中，裙带关系的发生率是否系统性和永久性地更高。为了调查对社会福利的影响，该项目调查了审计是否通过增加裙带关系雇用的官僚而永久性地降低了官僚机构的质量(以教育、私营部门的收入和技能衡量)及其业绩(以提供教育等关键公共服务的质量衡量)。

Several governments have tried to curb corruption via audits. However, audits inevitably reveal some forms of corruption better than others, and corrupt officials can adapt. Thus, could audits systematically increase the incidence of forms of corruption they do not reveal? If so, could this increase have permanent welfare consequences? This research project addresses these questions empirically. To do so, it exploits a Brazilian anti-corruption program which randomly selected thousands of local governments to be audited between 2003 and 2015. While this program successfully uncovered some forms of corruption, it did not uncover nepotistic practices. To measure the systematic incidence of this alternative form of corruption over time, this project uses information on the full names of the universe of mayors and public sector employees hired without a competitive civil service examination in Brazil, using surnames to identify family connections. The project then tests whether the incidence of nepotism is systematically - and permanently - greater in audited municipalities. To investigate implications for society's welfare, the project investigates whether audits, by inducing an increase in nepotistically hired bureaucrats, permanently reduce the quality of the bureaucracy (as measured by education, private sector earnings and skill)and its performance (as measured by the quality of provision of key public services, like education).