Duties to change desires that sustain oppressive structures

我们是否有义务去改变那些维持压迫性结构的欲望？要回答这个首要问题，需要回答以下三个问题：如果有的话，是哪种欲望维持了压迫性的结构？他们是如何做到的呢？2. 我们有义务改变这些欲望吗？如果有，这些是什么样的职责？反对人有责任改变欲望的观点是否成功？研究背景、方法和来源、原创性/创新和对知识的贡献（学术影响）：一些欲望维持了压迫性的系统——例如，当许多女性渴望有一个男性化的男朋友时，这有助于维持父权制的性别角色。在这个项目中，我将激励并捍卫这样一种观点：当我们的欲望维持着一个压迫性的系统时，我们有责任尝试改变我们的欲望（有时是他人的欲望）。首先，我们有责任培养破坏这些结构的欲望。例如，发现“传统上没有吸引力”的身体是美丽和性感的。第二，我们有责任破坏产生压迫欲望的制度。例如，色情作品，如果它在塑造我们的性欲方面起着有害的作用。我的方法论将包括概念分析；例如，我将探讨女性化或男性化的含义。我还将借鉴改进的工具-理论化我们如何改变一个概念，以实现特定的政治目标（Haslanger, 2012）。在探索欲望在维持压迫中的作用时，我将借鉴道德心理学和关于适应性偏好的文献。在第一部分中，我通过检查对性、性别和审美欲望的批评来识别争论中的欲望。例如，亚洲女性的性恋物癖有助于维持种族主义等级制度（Zheng, 2016）；符合传统性别角色的愿望——例如，成为传统的女性——可能会导致父权伤害（Chu, 2018）；想要变瘦和为了审美而节食的愿望可能会维持压抑的审美标准（Eaton, 2016）。在第二部分，我将对我们所承担的责任进行积极的论证。首先，我解释了为什么这些应该被视为义务，而不仅仅是行动的理由。其次，我解释了为什么我们要承担这些责任，而不是我认为的其他一些选择。在第三部分，我为我的观点辩护，反对其他哲学家提出的潜在反对意见和反对意见。第一种反对意见是，这些关税将是不公平的或不道德的。例如，这是幼稚的建议，人们无法做出自己的选择，什么会伤害他们（Srinivasan, 2021）。我认为，问题不在于他们是否伤害了自己，而在于他们是否伤害了他人，因此对家长作风的担忧与此无关。另一个道德上的反对意见是，每个人都有不同的位置来抵制这种欲望（钱伯斯，2022）。我认为，不同的人有不同的位置来履行义务，这是义务的一个共同特征，就像给予慈善机构的义务一样，因此，同样的情况也适用于没有政治上不良愿望的义务。第二种反对意见是，由于将结构性问题视为个人问题，因此支持这些关税将是不切实际的或在政治上适得其反（Srinivasan, 2021）；我认为，虽然这些问题是结构性的，但为了解决这些问题，有必要改变个人的愿望模式。

Do we have duties to change desires that we hold which sustain oppressive structures? Answering this overarching question will involve taking on the following three questions: 1. Which desires, if any, sustain oppressive structures? How do they do so? 2. Do we have duties to change these desires? If so, what kind of duties are these?3. Are the objections to the view that one has duties to change desires like these successful?Research context, methods and sources, originality/innovation and contribution to knowledge (academic impact): Some desires sustain oppressive systems - for example, when lots of women desire to have a manly boyfriend, this helps to sustain patriarchal gender roles. In this project, I will motivate and defend the view that we have duties to try to change our desires (and sometimes, the desires of others) when those desires sustain an oppressive system. First, we have a duty to cultivate desires which disrupt these structures. For example, finding "conventionally unattractive" bodies beautiful and sexually desirable. Second, we have a duty to undermine systems which produce desires that sustain oppression. For example, pornography, if it plays a harmful role in shaping our sexual desires. My methodology will involve conceptual analysis; for example, I will explore what it means to be feminine or masculine. I will also draw upon the tools of amelioration - theorising about how we might change a concept for a certain political goal (Haslanger, 2012). In exploring the role of desires in sustaining oppression, I will draw on moral psychology and the literature on adaptive preferences. In the first section, I identify the desires at issue through examining critiques of critiques of sexual, gendered, and aesthetic desires. For example, sexual fetishes for Asian women play help to sustain racist hierarchies (Zheng, 2016); the desire to conform to traditional gender roles - for example, to be traditionally feminine - may contribute to patriarchal harm (Chu, 2018); the desire to be thin and to go on a diet for aesthetic reasons may sustain oppressive beauty standards (Eaton, 2016). In the second section, I will make my positive argument for the duties we are under. First, I explain why these should be considered duties, rather than merely as reasons for action. Second, I explain why we are under these duties instead of some alternatives I consider. In the third section, I defend my view against potential objections and objections raised by other philosophers. The first type of objection is that these duties would be unfair or unethical. For example, it is infantilising to suggest people are incapable of making their own choices about what will harm them (Srinivasan, 2021). I argue the issue is not whether they harm themselves but whether they harm others, so concerns of paternalism are not relevant. Another ethical objection is that everyone is differently placed to resist such desires (Chambers, 2022). I argue that it is a common feature of duties that different people are differently placed to carry them out, as with the duty to give to charity, so it is no problem that the same goes for duties not to have politically bad desires. The second type of objection is that endorsing these duties would be impractical or politically counter-productive in virtue of casting a structural problem as if it is an individual problem (Srinivasan, 2021); I argue that, while these problems are structural, it is necessary for individual patterns of desire to change in order to solve them.