Conceptualizing Individual Moral Obligation: A Case for Collectively Insignificant Outcomes

在这篇论文中，我与茱莉亚·内夫斯基（Julia Nefsky）的观点相反，认为“集体伤害问题”超越了一个错误的假设，它揭示了一个糟糕的概念，即个人有义务以与道德相关的方式行事，而不管集体无关紧要的结果。除其他事项外，我的目标是建立为什么个人道德义务（以下简称“IMO”）可以最好地激励集体无关紧要的行为的压倒一切的原则，将其概念化为共同利益所必需的“非集体基本义务”。对于集体伤害案例（Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011），以及集体和个人义务/责任案例（Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020），有多种说法。Nefsky（2017: 2744）阐述了一个富有洞察力的案例，将集体无关紧要的行为称为“集体伤害问题”，将集体无关紧要的行为称为“集体影响案例”。根据Nefsky（2019: 1）的说法，“集体伤害”发生在“当足够多的人以某种方式采取行动，造成严重伤害时，但相关的个人行为本身似乎没有产生影响”的情况下。集体伤害案件中的问题抓住了“我们共同带来可避免伤害的风险”（Nefsky 2019: 10），因为我们相信，我们单一的善行不会产生任何影响，所以采取了道德上有害的行动，或拒绝以道德上相关的方式行事。这在某种程度上免除了我们单一的有害行为的道德责任，因为我们没有“道德相关的理由”去做其他事情。这种观点也可以称为无效应观点（见Sinnott-Armstrong 2005）。内夫斯基认为这种思考问题的方式是错误的。对于Nefsky（2019: 10）来说，我们的单一行动“太小而无法改变结果本身并不意味着无法朝着不同的结果采取非多余的行动。”因此，内夫斯基的立场肯定了单个行为在带来结果方面的相关性，即使它不能集体产生影响。然而，这种思考集体伤害案件的方式有什么错呢？作为个体，是否有理由以道德相关的方式行事，而不顾集体无关紧要的结果？如果是，那么采取行动的最佳理由是什么？有意识地以一种导致道德有害结果的方式行事有什么错吗？同样，如果我们尽自己的一份力量造成了集体伤害，那么，是什么让我们尽自己的一份力量促成集体解决方案在道德上显得微不足道呢？本研究最重要和最核心的是，国际海事组织在集体影响案例中的地位是什么？国际海事组织能否为集体微不足道的结果提供更好的动机或基础？本研究将尝试参与并提供这些相关问题的合理答案。

In this thesis, I argue, contra Julia Nefsky, that the 'problem of collective harm' goes beyond a mistaken assumption to reveal a poor conceptualization of individual obligation to act in morally relevant ways, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes. I aim to establish among other things, why the overriding principle for collectively insignificant actions can best be motivated by individual moral obligation - hereafter 'IMO' - conceptualized as a 'non-collective fundamental duty' necessary for the common good. There are various accounts of collective harm cases (Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011), as well as collective and individual-obligation/responsibility cases (Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020). Nefsky (2017: 2744) articulates an insightful case of collectively insignificant actions as 'the problem of collective harm' and the cases of collectively insignificant actions as "collective impact cases. According to Nefsky (2019: 1), 'collective harm' arises in cases where "when enough people act in a certain sort of way serious harm results, and yet no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference." The issue in collective harm cases captures "the risk of our together bringing about avoidable harm" (Nefsky 2019: 10) by taking a morally harmful course of action or refusing to act in a morally relevant way because of the belief that collectively, our singular good acts will make no difference. This, in some way, absolves our singular harmful actions of moral responsibility as we have no 'morally relevant reason' to act otherwise. This view can also be referred to as the no-effect view (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Nefsky thinks this way of thinking about the problem is mistaken. For Nefsky (2019: 10), our singular actions "[b]eing too small to change the outcome by itself does not mean being unable to make a non-superfluous move toward a different outcome." Consequently, Nefsky takes a position that affirms the relevance of singular acts in bringing about an outcome, even if it fails to make a difference collectively. However, what is wrong with this way of thinking about collective harm cases? Is there a reason for acting in a morally relevant way as individuals, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes? If yes, what is the best justification for acting anyway? Is there anything wrong with consciously acting in a way that contributes to a morally harmful outcome? Also, if we do our part to contribute to collective harm, then what makes doing our part to contribute to a collective solution morally insignificant? Most importantly and central to this research, what is the place of IMO in collective impact cases? Can IMO provide a better motivation or grounding for collectively insignificant outcomes? This research will attempt to engage and provide defensible answers to these relevant questions.