Lying, Misleading and What is Said

撒谎和误导之间的区别是非常自然的。一名男子开枪打死了自己的父母，然后打电话给警察，说有人开枪打了我的父母，这是误导，但他没有撒谎。关于这一区别的道德意义众说纷纭，但很少有人怀疑它的存在。谎言和误导性之间的区别取决于所说的话的概念。除非一个人说了一些虚假的话(或者至少是一些他认为是假的)，否则人不能撒谎。但“说什么”的概念在语言哲学中引起了极大的争议，许多相互竞争的概念也争论不休。一些人坚持认为，所说的话必须在心理上是真实的--容易理解，并在演讲者的精神生活中扮演一个明确定义的角色。其他人认为，这只是一个理论家的概念，对演讲者的生活没有意义。但是，无论谎言/误导性的区别涉及什么说话的概念，它显然对普通说话者具有真正的直觉意义--否则，当我们觉得有必要误导时，为什么我们会发现如此自然地努力寻找一种陈述不是谎言的东西的方式？我的项目的一部分将涉及所说内容的概念：首先，我将在考虑到谎言/误导性区别的情况下审查当前的争议，辩称没有一个可用的候选人能够完成必要的工作来捕捉这种巨大的直觉区别。接下来，我将提供我自己的说法概念，特别是在考虑到谎言/误导性区别的情况下制定的。我的项目的第二部分涉及撒谎/误导性区分的伦理意义。正如我已经指出的，许多人认为误导比撒谎更可取，努力创造出仅仅是误导而不是谎言的措辞是非常自然的。尽管如此，这确实是一个令人费解的偏好。说谎者和误导者都故意让别人有错误的信念。他们这样做是通过说假话，还是说真话，有什么关系呢？人们给出了一系列理由，说明他们更喜欢误导人，而不是撒谎。我将从检查这些开始，牢记说的本质。事实证明，这句话的性质对这个伦理问题出人意料地重要，因为将谎言挑出来进行特别谴责的论点往往会把矛头指向关于这句话的运作方式的说法。我会争辩说，密切关注交流的方式表明，现有的理由是站不住脚的。尽管如此，我确实认为谎言和误导之间的区别具有道德意义。我认为这种区别的道德意义是合理的，但这需要比以前使用的更复杂的交流图景。最后，我将我的调查结果应用于各种著名和有趣的谎言和误导性案件，包括克林顿性丑闻、其他各种政治言论和一些有趣的历史案例。然后，我的项目使用伦理学的见解来阐明语言上具有重要意义的概念所说的话；它使用语言哲学的洞察力来阐明谎言和误导性之间的道德区别。

The distinction between lying and misleading is an immensely natural one. One who shoots his parents and then phones the police, saying 'Someone shot my parents' has misled, but he has not lied. Opinions vary as to the moral significance of this distinction, but few doubt its existence.The distinction between lying and misleading turns on the notion of what is said. One cannot lie unless one says something false (or at least something one believes to be false). But the notion of what is said is the subject of tremendous controversy in philosophy of language, with many competing notions hotly contested. Some maintain that what is said must be psychologically real-- easily accessible, and playing a clearly defined role in the mental lives of speakers. Others argue that it is merely a theoretician's notion, of no significance in the lives of speakers. But whatever notion of saying is involved in the lying/misleading distinction, it is clearly one of genuine intuitive significance to ordinary speakers-- why else would we find it so natural to struggle for a way of stating something that is not a lie, when we feel the need to mislead? One part of my project will concern the notion of what is said: First, I will examine the current controversy with the lying/misleading distinction in mind, arguing that none of the available candidates can do the work needed to capture this immensely intuitive distinction. Next, I will offer my own conception of saying, specifically formulated with the lying/misleading distinction in mind. The second part of my project concerns the ethical significance of the lying/misleading distinction. As I've noted, many people assume that misleading is preferable to lying, and it is very natural to work hard to craft utterances that merely mislead rather than lie. Nonetheless, this is really quite a puzzling preference. Both the liar and the misleader deliberately work to bring it about that someone else has a false belief. Why should it matter whether they do this by saying something false, or by saying something true? A number of justifications have been given for preferring mere misleading to lying. I will begin by examining these, bearing in mind the nature of saying. The nature of saying turns out to be surprisingly important to this ethical question, because the arguments that single out lying for special condemnation tend to turn on claims about the way that saying works. I will argue that close attention to the ways that communcation works reveals that existing justifications are untenable. Nonetheless, I do think there is moral significance to the distinction between lying and misleading. I will argue that the moral significance of this distinction can be justified, but that this requires a far more complicated picture of communication than has previously been employed.Finally, I apply the results of my investigation to a variety of famous and interesting cases of lying and misleading, including the Clinton sex scandal, various other political utterances, and some interesting historical cases.My project, then, uses insights from ethics to shed light on the linguistically significant notion of what is said; and it uses insights from philosophy of language to shed light on the moral distinction between lying and misleading.