Novel Contractual Arrangements in the Pharmaceutical Industry

该研究项目的主要目标是开发一些数学模型，以研究制药行业中新颖而重要的合同安排。我将重点关注三个主要领域：******1。*** 1 .药品企业与第三方支付方风险分担合同；可用于增加低收入国家基本药物供应的合同；***3。可用于确保高收入国家药品供应顺畅的合同。******上述三个领域的相似之处在于：它们都可能涉及付款人（如保险公司、政府医疗保健付款人或非政府组织）之间的合同；2. 已经提出了各种形式的“基于结果”的合同，作为每种问题的解决方案；和3。听起来理性的政策建议可能会带来意想不到的严重后果。******对于每个子主题，我将调查付款人和制药公司（制造商）之间的一些拟议和潜在合同。本分析的关键问题包括以下一些：各种合同结构可能产生的有意和无意的影响是什么？对于一个给定的契约结构，什么是构建支付的最优方式？不同的合同结构在成本、绩效和其他有用的指标方面是如何比较的？***请注意，主要重点不是保健或保健服务。相反，重点是理解合同本身的结构和行为，以及它们如何影响参与合同的各方的激励

The primary objective of this program of research is to develop a number of mathematical models to study novel and important contractual arrangements in the pharmaceutical industry. I will focus on three main areas:******1. Risk sharing contracts between drug companies and third-party payers;***2. Contracts that could be used to increase the supply of essential medicines in low-income countries;***3. Contracts that could be used to ensure smooth supply of medicines in high-income countries.******The three areas identified above are similar in that: 1. They all may involve contracts between a payer (such as an insurance company, a government healthcare payer or a non-governmental organization(NGO); 2. Various forms of “outcomes based” contracts have been proposed as solutions for each type of problem; and 3. There may be serious unintended consequences from policy proposals that sound rational. ******For each subtopic I will investigate a number of proposed and potential contracts between payers and pharmaceutical companies (manufacturers). Key questions of this analysis include some of the following: What are the likely intentional and unintended effects of various contract structures? For a given contract structure, what is the optimal way to structure payments? How do different contract structures compare in terms of cost, performance, and other useful metrics? ***Note that the primary focus is not on health or health delivery. Rather, the focus is on understanding the structure and behavior of the contracts themselves, and how they influence the incentives of parties participating in the contracts.**