Strict or graduated punishment? Effect of punishment strictness on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods games.
Strict or graduated punishment? Effect of punishment strictness on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods games.
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严格惩罚还是分级惩罚？ 惩罚严格程度对连续公共物品博弈中合作演化的影响。
DOI：
10.1371/journal.pone.0059894
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Nakamaru M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shimao H;Nakamaru M
代价高昂的惩罚是否鼓励合作是合作与社会科学演化研究的主要问题之一。在社会中，惩罚有助于阻止人们藐视制度规则。具体来说，分级惩罚是长效公共资源制度的设计原则。在本研究中，我们考察了当每个个体都参与公共物品博弈，并且有机会惩罚合作水平低于惩罚者阈值的其他人时，渐进式惩罚是否能促进更高的合作水平。然后，我们研究了空间结构如何影响进化动态，当每个个体的死亡与社交互动产生的游戏分数成反比，并且从群体中随机选择另一个玩家来产生后代，以填补玩家死亡后产生的空白。我们的进化模拟结果表明，在空间结构群体中，更严格的惩罚比分级惩罚更能促进合作，而当玩家与随机选择的对手互动时，分级惩罚比严格惩罚更能促进合作。数学分析也支持了这一结果。
Whether costly punishment encourages cooperation is one of the principal questions in studies on the evolution of cooperation and social sciences. In society, punishment helps deter people from flouting rules in institutions. Specifically, graduated punishment is a design principle for long-enduring common-pool resource institutions. In this study, we investigate whether graduated punishment can promote a higher cooperation level when each individual plays the public goods game and has the opportunity to punish others whose cooperation levels fall below the punisher’s threshold. We then examine how spatial structure affects evolutionary dynamics when each individual dies inversely proportional to the game score resulting from the social interaction and another player is randomly chosen from the population to produce offspring to fill the empty site created after a player’s death. Our evolutionary simulation outcomes demonstrate that stricter punishment promotes increased cooperation more than graduated punishment in a spatially structured population, whereas graduated punishment increases cooperation more than strict punishment when players interact with randomly chosen opponents from the population. The mathematical analysis also supports the results.
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影响因子：
4.3
作者：
Helbing D;Szolnoki A;Perc M;Szabó G
通讯作者：
Szabó G
广义收益函数对连续策略空间公共物品博弈合作演化的影响
影响因子：
2.4
作者：
Chen, Xiaojie;Szolnoki, Attila;Wang, Long
通讯作者：
Wang, Long
影响因子：
1.1
作者：
Chu, CYC;Hu, SC;Huang, TY
通讯作者：
Huang, TY
影响因子：
2
作者：
HAMILTON, WD
通讯作者：
HAMILTON, WD
影响因子：
56.9
作者：
AXELROD, R;HAMILTON, WD
通讯作者：
HAMILTON, WD