Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758
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发表时间：
2010-04-29
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Szabó G
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Helbing D;Szolnoki A;Perc M;Szabó G
个人必须为共同努力作出贡献或共享稀缺资源的情况无处不在。然而，如果没有适当的机制来确保合作，最大化个人成功的进化压力往往会造成公地悲剧(例如过度捕捞或破坏我们的环境)。这一贡献用进化博弈论的方法解决了人类行为的一些相关谜题，因为它已经成功地被多次用于解释从细菌到脊椎动物的其他生物物种的行为。我们的基于代理的模型区分了采用四种不同行为策略的个人：不合作的个人(“叛逃者”)，放弃惩罚努力的合作个人(称为“合作者”或“二阶搭便车者”)，惩罚非合作行为的合作者(“道德家”)，以及叛逃者，尽管他们自己不合作(“不道德者”)，但惩罚其他叛逃者(“不道德者”)。通过考虑与邻近个体的空间交互作用，我们的模型揭示了几个有趣的效应：首先，道德家可以完全消除合作者。这种惩罚性行为的蔓延需要行为策略的隔离，解决了“二阶搭便车问题”。第二，即使在很长一段时间后(谁笑到最后笑效果最好)，系统行为也会发生显著变化。第三，许多叛逃者的存在可以在很大程度上加速道德家对非惩罚性合作者的胜利。第四，为了成功，道德家可能会以一种看起来像是“邪恶合作”的方式，从不道德者那里获利。我们的发现表明，惩罚策略的考虑使人们能够通过博弈论的概念来理解“道德行为”的建立和传播。这表明，即使在到目前为止已经用非数学概念解决的领域中，定量生物学建模方法也是强大的。作为不同行为策略之间进化竞争的结果，某些社会行为的复杂动态变得可以理解。为什么朋友们自发地提出相互接受的规则、合作和团结，而在大型社区中，共同道德标准的创建往往失败？在“地球村”里，每个人都可以与其他任何人互动，惩罚作弊的人是不值得的。道德家(承担惩罚努力的合作个人)之所以消失，是因为与不惩罚的合作者(所谓的“二阶搭便车人”)相比，他们处于劣势。然而，合作者被搭便车的人利用。这造成了一场“公地悲剧”，每个人最终都是不合作的。然而，当人们像大多数人那样与朋友或当地邻居互动时，道德家可以通过与非惩罚性合作者分开来逃避与他们的直接竞争。此外，在与搭便车者的竞争中，道德家比非惩罚性合作者更能捍卫自己的利益。因此，道德家虽然在一开始就严重枯竭，但最终可以传遍世界(谁笑到最后，效果就会最好)。引人注目的是，少数不合作的个体(“越轨行为”)的存在可以加速道德家的胜利。为了传播，道德家还可能与具有双重道德标准的人形成一种“邪恶的合作”，即搭便车者既惩罚不合作的行为，又不合作的自己。
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals (“defectors”), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called “cooperators” or “second-order free-riders”), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior (“moralists”), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves (“immoralists”). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the “second-order free-rider problem”. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times (“who laughs last laughs best effect”). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an “unholy collaboration”. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of “moral behavior” by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies. Why do friends spontaneously come up with mutually accepted rules, cooperation, and solidarity, while the creation of shared moral standards often fails in large communities? In a “global village”, where everybody may interact with anybody else, it is not worthwhile to punish people who cheat. Moralists (cooperative individuals who undertake punishment efforts) disappear because of their disadvantage compared to cooperators who do not punish (so-called “second-order free-riders”). However, cooperators are exploited by free-riders. This creates a “tragedy of the commons”, where everybody is uncooperative in the end. Yet, when people interact with friends or local neighbors, as most people do, moralists can escape the direct competition with non-punishing cooperators by separating from them. Moreover, in the competition with free-riders, moralists can defend their interests better than non-punishing cooperators. Therefore, while seriously depleted in the beginning, moralists can finally spread all over the world (“who laughs last laughs best effect”). Strikingly, the presence of a few non-cooperative individuals (“deviant behavior”) can accelerate the victory of moralists. In order to spread, moralists may also form an “unholy cooperation” with people having double moral standards, i.e., free-riders who punish non-cooperative behavior, while being uncooperative themselves.
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0507229103
发表时间：
2006-01-10
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Brandt, H;Hauert, C;Sigmund, K
通讯作者：
Sigmund, K
DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0811503106
发表时间：
2009-03-10
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
Helbing, Dirk;Yu, Wenjian
通讯作者：
Yu, Wenjian
影响因子：
1.4
作者：
Bowles, S;Gintis, H
通讯作者：
Gintis, H
影响因子：
56.9
作者：
Herrmann, Benedikt;Thoeni, Christian;Gachter, Simon
通讯作者：
Gachter, Simon
影响因子：
8.6
作者：
Dornic, I;Chaté, H;Hinrichsen, H
通讯作者：
Hinrichsen, H