Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice
Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice
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不同规模群体的合作：惩罚和基于声誉的合作伙伴选择的影响
DOI：
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02956
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发表时间：
2020-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Paul A. M. Van Lange
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Junhui Wu;Daniel Balliet;Leonard S.Peperkoorn;Angelo Romano;Paul A. M. Van Lange
声誉和惩罚是促进陌生人之间合作的两种不同机制。然而，对其有效性的实证研究主要局限于相对较小的群体，而没有涉及它们如何在相对较大的群体中加强合作。我们通过测试基于声誉的伙伴选择和惩罚在多大程度上促进了小群体和大群体的合作，从不同的角度来解决文献中的这一空白。先前的研究认识到，群体规模的增加伴随着激励结构的变化，这决定了诱惑（无论他人如何选择，每个人从不合作中获得的额外利益）或收益（每个人从完全合作中获得的额外利益）是保持不变还是随着群体规模的变化而变化。因此，我们首先测试了当诱惑或收益随着群体规模的增加而增加时，群体规模是如何影响合作的（研究1），然后继续测试对不同群体规模下声誉和惩罚有效性的预测（研究2）。在研究1 （N = 820）中，我们将参与者随机分配到4人、20人或40人的小组中玩一次在线公共物品游戏，同时保持小组边际收益或边际人均收益固定，在这种情况下，诱惑或收益随着小组规模的增加而增加。在研究2 （N = 1132）中，我们进一步比较了涉及惩罚或声誉机制的公共物品情况与跨群体规模的匿名情况，而群体边际收益在群体中是固定的。总的来说，我们发现当诱惑随着群体规模的增加而增加时，20人的群体在一次互动中的合作明显少于4人的群体，这种影响可以通过对他人合作的低期望、更低的集体效能感和更大的感知冲突来解释。然而，40人和4人小组在一次性合作方面没有差异。重要的是，基于声誉的合作伙伴选择和惩罚总是在不同规模的群体中促进一次性合作。这些发现表明，群体规模对合作的影响并不简单，并强调了声誉和惩罚在促进合作（至少在一次性互动中）方面的效用，而不管群体规模大小。
Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively small groups and does not address how they enhance cooperation in relatively larger groups. We address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses from competing perspectives about the extent to which reputation-based partner choice and punishment enhance cooperation in both small and large groups. Prior work recognizes that an increase in group size is accompanied by a change in the incentive structure, which determines whether the temptation (extra benefit for each person from non-cooperation over cooperation, regardless of others’ choices) or gain (extra benefit for each person from full cooperation over full non-cooperation) remains constant or varies with group size. Thus, we first test how group size affects cooperation when temptation or gain increases with group size (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the effectiveness of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 820), we randomly assigned participants to play an online one-shot public goods game in groups of 4, 20, or 40, while keeping the marginal group return or marginal per capita return fixed across groups, in which case the temptation or gain increased with group size. In Study 2 (N = 1,132), we further compared a public goods situation involving a punishment or reputation mechanism with an anonymous situation across group sizes, while the marginal group return was fixed across groups. Overall, we found that when temptation increased with group size, 20-person groups cooperated significantly less than 4-person groups in one-shot interactions, and that this effect was explained by lower expectation of others’ cooperation, less perceived collective efficacy, and greater perceived conflict. However, 40-person and 4-person groups did not vary in one-shot cooperation. Importantly, reputation-based partner choice and punishment invariably promoted one-shot cooperation in groups of different sizes. These findings suggest no simple effect of group size on cooperation and underscore the utility of reputation and punishment in fostering cooperation (at least in one-shot interactions) regardless of the size of groups.
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DOI：
10.1353/book.3378
发表时间：
1884-07
期刊：
Edinburgh Medical Journal
影响因子：
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DOI：
10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0012
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DOI：
10.1016/j.socec.2007.06.014
发表时间：
2007-05
期刊：
Macroeconomics: Consumption
影响因子：
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发表时间：
2017-11
期刊：
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影响因子：
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