Best response game of traffic on road network of non-signalized intersections
Best response game of traffic on road network of non-signalized intersections
复制标题
无信号交叉口路网交通最佳响应博弈
DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.032
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发表时间：
2018-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Liying Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wang Yao;Ning Jia;Shiquan Zhong;Liying Li
本文研究了具有非信号交叉口的网格路网中的交通流。模拟网络中驾驶员的性质，以便他们与其他驾驶员玩迭代的雪堆游戏。应用元胞自动机模型来研究游戏过程中交通流的特征和驾驶员行为的演化。司机使用最佳响应作为更新规则的策略。揭示了三个主要发现。首先，随着成本效益比r的增加，模拟中的合作率呈阶梯状下降，并且可以分析得出合作率作为成本效益比r的函数。其次，我们发现较高的合作率对应于较高的平均速度、较低的密度和较高的流量。这表明，叛逃者降低了无信号交叉口的交通效率。第三，当密度较低时，系统会经历更多的随机性，因为当密度较低时，驾驶员将没有太多机会更新策略。这些发现有助于展示交通网络中驾驶员的策略如何演变以及他们的相互作用如何影响交通系统的整体性能。
This paper studies the traffic flow in a grid road network with non-signalized intersections. The nature of the drivers in the network is simulated such that they play an iterative snowdrift game with other drivers. A cellular automata model is applied to study the characteristics of the traffic flow and the evolution of the behaviour of the drivers during the game. The drivers use best-response as their strategy to update rules. Three major findings are revealed. First, the cooperation rate in simulation experiences staircase-shaped drop as cost to benefit ratio r increases, and cooperation rate can be derived analytically as a function of cost to benefit ratio r. Second, we find that higher cooperation rate corresponds to higher average speed, lower density and higher flow. This reveals that defectors deteriorate the efficiency of traffic on non-signalized intersections. Third, the system experiences more randomness when the density is low because the drivers will not have much opportunity to update strategy when the density is low. These findings help to show how the strategy of drivers in a traffic network evolves and how their interactions influence the overall performance of the traffic system.
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影响因子：
64.8
作者：
Robert M. May
通讯作者：
Robert M. May
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_18
发表时间：
1998-05
期刊：
arXiv: Statistical Mechanics
影响因子：
--
作者：
D. Helbing
通讯作者：
D. Helbing
影响因子：
36.8
作者：
Mauro Santos;E. Szathmáry
通讯作者：
Mauro Santos;E. Szathmáry
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014
发表时间：
2010-07
期刊：
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)
影响因子：
--
作者：
Ryan Oprea;Keith Henwood;D. Friedman
通讯作者：
Ryan Oprea;Keith Henwood;D. Friedman
具有非信号化交叉点的元胞自动机模型中的困境博弈
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
Zhang, W.;Zhang, W.;Chen, W.
通讯作者：
Chen, W.