Optimizing product service system by franchise fee contracts under information asymmetry
Optimizing product service system by franchise fee contracts under information asymmetry
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信息不对称下特许经营费合同优化产品服务体系
DOI：
10.1007/s10479-013-1505-2
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发表时间：
2016-05
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Pui-Sze Chow
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wenming Xie;赵映雪;Zhibin Jiang;Pui-Sze Chow
研究了在私有需求信息不对称的情况下，服务型制造供应链中如何有效地提供产品服务系统的问题。供应链中的PSS是异质互补的，制造商提供产品，而拥有私人需求信息的零售商负责在基本产品上添加必要的增值服务。我们解决了不同的合同如何影响供应链成员的决策和盈利能力的问题。开发了三种类型的合同，以帮助供应链合作伙伴做出决策，提高供应链的效率。第一种是特许经营费（FF）合同，制造商提供一个由两部分组成的关税合同（批发价格和特许经营费）来影响零售商的决策，并检测其私人需求信息。第二种是带有服务要求的特许经营费用（FFS）合同，根据该合同，除了两部分关税合同条款外，制造商还指定所需的服务水平。第三种是集中式服务要求加营费合同（FFCS），与FFS合同类似，但制造商规定的服务水平是系统最优解。我们的分析结果表明，这三种合同都使制造商能够检测到零售商的私人需求信息，其中FFCS合同获得的渠道利润最大。最后，给出了数值算例，并对服务水平和利润进行了敏感性分析，比较了三种合同在不同设置下的绩效。本文为制造商在不同条件下的合同提供了管理指导。
This paper studies the problem of how to effectively provide product service system (PSS) in a service-oriented manufacturing supply chain under asymmetric private demand information. The PSS in the supply chain is operated heterogeneously and complementarily, in which the manufacturer provides the product while the retailer who possesses private demand information is responsible for adding the necessary value-added service on the basic product. We address the issue of how different contracts affect the decisions and profitability of the supply chain members. Three types of contracts are developed to help supply chain partners to make decisions and enhance the supply chain’s efficiency. The first is the franchise fee (FF) contract, under which the manufacturer provides a two-part tariff contract (wholesale price and franchise fee) to influence the retailer’s decision and to detect her private demand information. The second is the franchise fee with service requirement (FFS) contract, under which the manufacturer specifies the service level required in addition to the two-part tariff contract terms. The third is the franchise fee with centralized service requirement (FFCS) contract, which is similar to the FFS contract but that the service level specified by the manufacturer is the system optimal solution. Our analytical results show that all three contracts enable the manufacturer to detect the retailer’s private demand information, with the FFCS contract achieving the greatest channel profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented, and sensitivity analysis of service level and profit are conducted to compare the performance of the three contracts under different settings. The paper provides managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in contract offering under different conditions.
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影响因子：
3.1
作者：
R. Lester
通讯作者：
R. Lester
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1100.1146
发表时间：
2008-11
期刊：
Manag. Sci.
影响因子：
--
作者：
G. Roels;U. Karmarkar;Scott M. Carr
通讯作者：
G. Roels;U. Karmarkar;Scott M. Carr
影响因子：
11.1
作者：
O. Mont
通讯作者：
O. Mont
DOI：
10.1287/msom.1060.0126
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag.
影响因子：
--
作者：
T. Taylor;E. Plambeck
通讯作者：
T. Taylor;E. Plambeck
DOI：
10.1080/0951192x.2010.511657
发表时间：
2011-05
影响因子：
4.1
作者：
Shuangxi Huang;Sen Zeng;Yushun Fan;G. Huang
通讯作者：
Shuangxi Huang;Sen Zeng;Yushun Fan;G. Huang