CONCEALING-Gate: Optical Contactless Probing Resilient Design
CONCEALING-Gate: Optical Contactless Probing Resilient Design
复制标题
CONCEALING-Gate:光学非接触式探测弹性设计
DOI:
--
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发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
2.2
通讯作者:
Navid Asadizanjani
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
M. T. Rahman;Nusrat Farzana;Dhwani Mehta;Shahin Tajik;M. Tehranipoor;Navid Asadizanjani
Optical probing, though developed as silicon debugging tools from the chip backside, has shown its capability of extracting secret data, such as cryptographic keys and user identifications, from modern system-on-chip devices. Existing optical probing countermeasures are based on detecting any device modification attempt or abrupt change in operating conditions during asset extraction. These countermeasures usually require additional fabrication steps and cause area and power overheads. In this article, we propose a novel low-overhead design methodology to prevent optical probing. It leverages additional operational logic gates, termed as “CONCEALING-Gates,” inserted as neighbor gates of the logic gates connected to the nets carrying asset signals. The switching activity of the asset carrying logic is camouflaged with the switching activity of the concealing-gate. The input signal and placement in the layout of the concealing-gates must be selected in such a way that they remain equally effective in preventing different variants of optical probing, i.e., electro-optical frequency mapping and Electro-optical probing. The methodology is suitable for the existing ASIC/FPGA design flow and fabrication process, since designing new standard logic cells is not required. We have performed a comprehensive security evaluation of the concealing-gates using a security metric developed based on the parameters that are crucial for optical probing. The attack resiliency of the logic cells, protected by concealing-gates, is evaluated using an empirical study-based simulation methodology and experimental validation. Our analysis has shown that in the presence of concealing-gates, logic cells achieve high resiliency against optical contactless probing techniques.
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DOI:
10.13154/tches.v2019.i3.86-118
发表时间:
2019-05
期刊:
IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst.
影响因子:
--
作者:
Bicky Shakya;Haoting Shen;M. Tehranipoor;Domenic Forte
通讯作者:
Bicky Shakya;Haoting Shen;M. Tehranipoor;Domenic Forte
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2019
期刊:
IEEE Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium
影响因子:
--
作者:
Covic, Ana;Shi, Qihang;Shen, Haoting;Forte, Domenic
通讯作者:
Forte, Domenic
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2020
期刊:
ITC-asia
影响因子:
--
作者:
Leonidas Lavdas, M Tanjidur
通讯作者:
Leonidas Lavdas, M Tanjidur
DOI:
10.1109/ivsw.2018.8494856
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
2018 IEEE 3rd International Verification and Security Workshop (IVSW
影响因子:
--
作者:
Rahman, M Tanjidur;Shi, Qihang;Tajik, Shahin;Shen, Haoting;Woodard, Damon L.;Tehranipoor, Mark;Asadizanjani, Navid
通讯作者:
Asadizanjani, Navid