The role of consumer behavior and power structures in coping with shoddy goods
The role of consumer behavior and power structures in coping with shoddy goods
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消费者行为和权力结构在应对伪劣商品中的作用
DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2021.102482
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发表时间：
2021-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Tong Wu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shu Hu;Ke Fu;Tong Wu
本文旨在了解日益普遍的假冒伪劣商品现象，帮助诚信企业更好地科普假冒伪劣商品生产者带来的不公平竞争。我们开发了一个博弈模型来研究一个诚实的优质商品制造商（说实话者）和一个不道德的劣质商品制造商（欺骗者）之间的相互作用。三种权力结构被认为是：与真相讲述者作为领导者，与欺骗者作为领导者，并与平等的权力球员。我们的均衡分析表明，当消费者只进行一次性购买时，说真话的人容易遭受利润损失。然而，一些权力结构可能有助于真相讲述者减轻利润损失的风险。具体而言，当欺骗者的公布质量足够低时，“说真话者为领导者”的权力结构降低了“说真话者”的利润损失风险;相反，当欺骗者的公布质量不够低时，“说真话者为领导者”的权力结构具有更好的缓解效果;而“等权力者”的权力结构总是效果最差。我们还调查了消费者的回购行为在打击假冒伪劣商品的作用，通过扩展模型，将消费者的不满和回购频率。数值研究表明，在诚实者主导的市场中，无论是消费者的重购频率较高还是消费者的重购频率中等，消费者的质量期望失认敏感性都能阻止欺骗者夸大其产品质量。我们的发现为寻求打击假冒伪劣商品的公司和行业提供了新的理论见解。
This paper aims to understand the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of shoddy goods and help honest firms better cope with the unfair competition posed by shoddy goods producers. We develop a game-theoretic model to examine the interaction between an honest manufacturer of quality goods (thetruth-teller) and an unscrupulous producer of shoddy goods (thedeceiver). Three power structures are considered: with the truth-teller as leader, with the deceiver as leader, and with equal-power players. Our equilibrium analysis suggests that when consumers make only one-time purchase, the truth-teller is prone to suffer profit loss. Yet some power structures may help the truth-teller mitigate the risk of losing profit. Specifically, when the announced quality of the deceiver is low enough, the truth-teller-as-leader power structure reduces the truth-teller’s risk of profit loss; in contrast, when the announced quality of the deceiver is not low enough, the deceiver-as-leader power structure has a better mitigating effect; and the equal-power-player power structure always works worst. We also investigate the role of consumer repurchase behavior in fighting shoddy goods by extending the model to incorporate consumer dissatisfaction and repurchase frequency. A numerical study indicates that consumers’ quality expectation disconfirmation sensitivity can deter the deceiver from exaggerating its product quality – either when consumers’ repurchase frequency is high or when consumers repurchase at a medium frequency in a market led by the truth-teller. Our findings yield new theoretical insights for firms and industries seeking to combat shoddy goods.
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