Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search
Delegated Search Approximates Efficient Search
复制标题
委托搜索近似于高效搜索
DOI：
10.1145/3219166.3219205
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kleinberg, Robert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kleinberg, Jon;Kleinberg, Robert
在许多设置中，主体通过将任务委托给代理来执行任务，代理搜索可能的解决方案并向主体提出一个解决方案。这说明了组织内工作流程的许多方面，以及监管机构开展的许多活动，这些机构往往通过授权程序从受监管方获得相关信息。授权背后的一个基本紧张关系是，代理人的利益通常与委托人的利益不同，可能差别很大，因此，代理人可能根据自己的激励措施提出对委托人来说效率低下的解决办法。因此，一个基本问题是设计机制，使委托人可以限制他们愿意从代理人那里接受的一组建议，以确保委托人从建议的解决方案中获得一定水平的质量。在这项工作中，我们调查了多少主要损失-定量，在他们试图优化的目标方面-当他们委托给代理人。我们开发了一种方法来限制这种效率的损失，并表明，在一个非常一般的委托模型，有一个家庭的机制，实现了普遍的约束之间的比例通过委托获得的解决方案的质量和质量的主要可以获得一个理想化的基准，他们寻找一个解决方案自己。此外，有可能通过具有自然阈值结构的机制来实现这种界限，因此，这种机制在结构上比关于授权的文献中通常考虑的最佳机制简单。在我们的框架的核心是一个意想不到的委托和先知不平等的分析，我们利用它来提供我们的委托机制的行为界限之间的联系。
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who often obtain relevant information from the parties being regulated through a process of delegation. A fundamental tension underlying delegation is the fact that the agent's interests will typically differ -- potentially significantly -- from the interests of the principal, and as a result the agent may propose solutions based on their own incentives that are inefficient for the principal. A basic problem, therefore, is to design mechanisms by which the principal can constrain the set of proposals they are willing to accept from the agent, to ensure a certain level of quality for the principal from the proposed solution. In this work, we investigate how much the principal loses -- quantitatively, in terms of the objective they are trying to optimize -- when they delegate to an agent. We develop a methodology for bounding this loss of efficiency, and show that in a very general model of delegation, there is a family of mechanisms achieving a universal bound on the ratio between the quality of the solution obtained through delegation and the quality the principal could obtain in an idealized benchmark where they searched for a solution themself. Moreover, it is possible to achieve such bounds through mechanisms with a natural threshold structure, which are thus structurally simpler than the optimal mechanisms typically considered in the literature on delegation. At the heart of our framework is an unexpected connection between delegation and the analysis of prophet inequalities, which we leverage to provide bounds on the behavior of our delegation mechanisms.
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影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
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DOI：
--
发表时间：
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期刊：
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影响因子：
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DOI：
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发表时间：
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期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
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影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
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DOI：
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发表时间：
2017-04
期刊：
Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
影响因子：
--
作者：
M. Abolhassani;S. Ehsani;Hossein Esfandiari;M. Hajiaghayi;Robert D. Kleinberg;Brendan Lucier
通讯作者：
M. Abolhassani;S. Ehsani;Hossein Esfandiari;M. Hajiaghayi;Robert D. Kleinberg;Brendan Lucier