What Could Go Wrong: Adults and Children Calibrate Predictions and Explanations of Others' Actions Based on Relative Reward and Danger.
What Could Go Wrong: Adults and Children Calibrate Predictions and Explanations of Others' Actions Based on Relative Reward and Danger.
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什么可能出错：成人和儿童根据相对回报和危险校准对他人行为的预测和解释。
DOI：
10.1111/cogs.13163
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发表时间：
2022-07
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Liu, Shari
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gjata, Nensi N.;Ullman, Tomer D.;Spelke, Elizabeth S.;Liu, Shari
当成年人做出决定时（例如，当我们不系安全带的时候，我们经常考虑如果我们的行动失败会产生的消极后果，即使我们从未经历过这样的失败。同样的考虑因素指导我们理解别人的决定吗？在这篇论文中，我们调查了是否成年人，谁拥有多年的经验，做出这样的决定，和6-和7-岁的孩子，谁没有经验，在判断自己的行为的后果明显更差，认为别人的行为是由奖励（多好达到一个人的预期目标将是）和我们所说的“危险”（一个人的行为可能会有多糟糕的结果）。在两个预先注册的实验中，我们测试了成年人和6岁和7岁的儿童是否会根据每个行动所带来的危险和奖励的具体程度来调整他们对代理人行动选择的预测和解释。在四个不同的任务中，我们发现儿童和成年人都希望别人对危险情况做出负面评价，并将他们行为的危险性降到最低。儿童和成人的判断系统地变化雅阁的危险程度的代理人面临的和价值的代理人放置在目标状态，它旨在实现。然而，儿童并没有校准他们的推理有多少代理价值的目标状态的一个成功的行动，在雅阁的危险程度的行动所带来的，和成年人校准这些推论更弱的推理代理的未来行动的选择。这些结果表明，从童年开始，人们就使用一定程度的危险和奖励来对他人的行为做出定量的、细粒度的解释和预测，这与包含其他代理人行动计划的连续表示的心理理论计算模型一致。
When human adults make decisions (e.g., wearing a seat belt), we often consider the negative consequences that would ensue if our actions were to fail, even if we have never experienced such a failure. Do the same considerations guide our understanding of other people's decisions? In this paper, we investigated whether adults, who have many years of experience making such decisions, and 6‐ and 7‐year‐old children, who have less experience and are demonstrably worse at judging the consequences of their own actions, conceive others' actions as motivated both by reward (how good reaching one's intended goal would be), and by what we call “danger” (how badly one's action could end). In two pre‐registered experiments, we tested whether adults and 6‐ and 7‐year‐old children tailor their predictions and explanations of an agent's action choices to the specific degree of danger and reward entailed by each action. Across four different tasks, we found that children and adults expected others to negatively appraise dangerous situations and minimize the danger of their actions. Children's and adults' judgments varied systematically in accord with both the degree of danger the agent faced and the value the agent placed on the goal state it aimed to achieve. However, children did not calibrate their inferences about how much an agent valued the goal state of a successful action in accord with the degree of danger the action entailed, and adults calibrated these inferences more weakly than inferences concerning the agent's future action choices. These results suggest that from childhood, people use a degree of danger and reward to make quantitative, fine‐grained explanations and predictions about other people's behavior, consistent with computational models on theory of mind that contain continuous representations of other agents' action plans.
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00515.x
发表时间：
2007-10-01
影响因子：
7.2
作者：
Plumert, Jodie M.;Kearney, Joseph K.;Cremer, James F.
通讯作者：
Cremer, James F.
影响因子：
4
作者：
AMPOFOBOATENG, K;THOMSON, JA
通讯作者：
THOMSON, JA
影响因子：
1.6
作者：
Burnham, Martin J.;Le, Yen K.;Piedmont, Ralph L.
通讯作者：
Piedmont, Ralph L.
影响因子：
4.6
作者：
Kretch KS;Adolph KE
通讯作者：
Adolph KE
影响因子：
4.6
作者：
Aboody, Rosie;Zhou, Caiqin;Jara-Ettinger, Julian
通讯作者：
Jara-Ettinger, Julian